Last Updated on June 8, 2026 by Chicago Policy Review Staff
After 16 years with Viktor Orbán at the helm of the Hungarian state, on April 12th Hungarians elected Péter Magyar as prime minister in a landslide victory with record turnout. Magyar and his Tisza party’s victory offer a rare chance to push back against democratic backsliding and rekindle warmer relationships with the rest of Europe after years of tense exchanges. Magyar, a former Orbán ally and Fidesz member, rose to prominence following a within-party pardon scandal in 2024 that many claimed exposed the hypocrisy of the ruling Fidesz party. Shortly after giving a blistering interview on the ruling party’s many misdeeds, Magyar joined Tisza and had been making headway in polls since.
For many, Orbán looked practically unbeatable. In recent years, Orbán became the poster child for strongman politics, attracting admiration both from Trump and Putin. So while victory in any election is impressive, Tizsa has overcome immense institutional barriers erected by Orbán and Fidesz to reduce democratic competition to attain a two-thirds majority in parliament. Early in Fidesz’s rule, the party dismissed members of the Election Commission to replace them with Fidesz loyalists and restructured the Media Authority with a former Fidesz MP at its head. In 2011, as part of the new constitutional process, the entire country was redistricted with limited transparency. The resulting districts varied significantly in size, in such a way that benefited Fidesz electoral outcomes in a system that already favored large parties. In addition to overcoming the lopsided election laws themselves, Magyar and Tisza have also had to battle in a media space that was increasingly dominated by Orbán loyalists. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) estimates that oligarchs with ties to Fidesz controlled 80% of the country’s media. During the election the Fidesz media machine was devoted to countering Magyar’s popularity by creating a fake policy platform to misinform the public on Tisza’s policies and by personally attacking Magyar and others. Against this institutional backdrop, the triumph of Magyar and Tizsa is an especially positive signal to political parties in Europe and elsewhere hoping to stop the dismantling of their own democracies.
The election results present a significant opportunity for Hungary to reshape institutions, reengage partners, and address the muddy waters between business and politics that have come to define Hungary. Tisza’s two-third’s majority gives it the power to amend the constitution and to dismiss officials in committees and state offices. The same institutions that allowed Fidesz to rule with few checks, could now enable Tisza to rapidly repeal their policies. This could allow swift movement on reforms related to media, the judiciary, and elections. This could stand in contrast to Poland, where the liberal coalition elected in 2023 was unable to attain a supermajority, and has been unable to repeal most of their predecessors undemocratic transgressions. Magyar noted that an early focus of his would be to root out corruption and reestablish checks and balances. This would not only help reinvigorate Hungarian democracy, but would also get Hungary closer to unlocking up to €17 billion in funding for infrastructure, green transition and other policy areas that had been frozen for rule of law violations.
Europe also stands to gain from Magyar’s win, as Hungary has been a major spoiler in the EU’s effort to support Ukraine and a foothold for Russian intelligence and disinformation in Europe. In his first news conference, PM-elect Magyar emphasized a turn away from Russia and toward Europe. This stands in stark contrast to Orbán, who last year vetoed a €90 billion loan for Ukraine after months of negotiations, ostensibly due to disputes over a damaged oil pipeline. Hungary under Orbán, along with Slovakia, also vetoed the 20th package of sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. In addition to thwarting EU plans to support Ukraine, Hungary has also been accused of discussing confidential EU policy with Russian officials and of cooperating to delist individuals from sanctions. Orbán’s defeat has sparked hope from leaders across Europe of a more cooperative engagement with Hungary in the future.
Though Magyar’s win signals a new era in Hungarian politics, challenges for the revival of Hungarian democracy remain. While the two-third majority may help dislodge Orbán loyalists in the courts and executive offices, Fidesz-friendly oligarchs and members of the security services may still challenge Magyar’s reform agenda. Additionally, the release of the frozen EU funds require significant progress by August 31st, which is a tall order for any new government. Failing to secure these funds, while the Hungarian economy continues to suffer from low growth, could challenge Magyar’s popularity early on. Furthermore, while Magyar has declared that he intends to pivot from Orbán’s policies, he ultimately shares many of Fidesz’s and Orbán’s views on immigration and social policies, raising questions of how significant this pivot could be. Finally, it would be remiss to not recognize that Magyar now benefits from the same institutional environment that Orbán did. While European leaders and many Hungarians are hopeful that Magyar will use this platform to fortify Hungary’s democracy, many such hopes in other countries have failed to materialize.
Magyar has opened the door to a post-Orbán future in Hungary. There will be immediate impacts for policy in Hungary and Europe for the economy, judicial system, Ukraine policy and more. After 16 years under Orbán, Hungary has an opportunity to define a new path for itself. However, the excitement surrounding Tisza’s victory has resonated with audiences far removed from Budapest or Brussels. It highlights that Orbán, and populists at large, can be defeated in elections. While the excitement is warranted, only time will tell if Tisza’s approach can defeat Orbánism and populism — an even more entrenched foe.