Last Updated on March 29, 2026 by Chicago Policy Review Staff
In 2028, the Trump administration’s second term will come to an end. As the United States approaches midterm elections this year, visions for what the U.S. might look like post Trump 2.0 will abound. This administration and its allies in Congress have moved the United States closer to illiberalism, defined by Freedom House as an ideological stance that rejects the necessity of independent institutions as checks on the government and dismisses the idea of legitimate disagreement in the public sphere.” By curtailing the rights of women and immigrants, endangering the freedom of the press, and ignoring the court rulings meant to constrain it, this administration has challenged key tenets of American democracy. The next administration faces a challenge to restore democratic institutions following years of democratic backsliding, as evidenced by falling democracy scores from multiple indices. Therefore, in thinking about post-Trump policy making, it is useful to consider the trajectory of a country that has recently grappled with these same challenges. Enter Poland.
In 2023, Poland’s opposition parties toppled Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), a conservative party that had been in power since 2015, in parliament. This signalled a dramatic shift in Polish politics after years of democratic backsliding, including restricting the freedom of the media and undermining judicial independence. Initial coverage of the resulting coalition, headed by Donald Tusk, highlighted its potential as a turning point for democracy in Poland and Europe more broadly. However, the Tusk government has struggled to undo the damage enacted by the previous government for three key reasons: entrenched PiS members in other parts of government that obstructed reforms, the inability to undo past policies without also acting undemocratically, and the belief that illiberalism had been defeated too soon. Future American politicians and citizens hoping for a rapid return to the pre-Trump status quo need to acknowledge that the road back will be a long one.
Enclaves of PiS members that remained in other branches of government after the 2023 election have slowed Poland’s reform agenda to a crawl. While much of the coalition’s platform centered on undoing the institutional erosion, necessary reforms were often vetoed or blocked by PiS members or loyalists in other branches of government. While the liberal opposition held control of both the lower house — the Sejm — and the Senate, President Andrzej Duda remained a loyal PiS member. Duda vetoed numerous proposals from Tusk’s coalition, and sent others to the PiS stacked Constitutional Tribunal, all but guaranteeing that they would never come into law. Projecting this onto a U.S. situation in 2028, even if Democrats win the White House, rolling back Trump policy will still be challenging due both to the need for passing legislation in both chambers of Congress, and due to the large number of Trump appointees in the courts and elsewhere that may complicate efforts to reform policy.
This brings us to the second challenge faced by Tusk’s coalition: how to change undemocratic policy democratically. A recent Journal of Democracy article notes that “a key legacy of illiberalism turns out to be a series of institutional traps that are difficult to counteract in the short term without resorting to the same methods that established them in the first place.” Tusk’s administration fell victim to what the authors call a trilemma, when it is near impossible to respond to illiberal policy with solutions that are “quick, effective, and unimpeachably legal.” Tusk and his government, in trying to rebuild judicial independence and repeal laws that curtailed media freedom, have occasionally faced criticism for their methods.
This was most evident in the Tusk government’s overhaul of Poland’s public media channels, which used a legal loophole to liquidate Telewizja Polska (TVP), Polish Press Agency (PAP), and Polish Radio to get around President Duda’s veto. The move drew criticism not only from PiS, but from the press and legal experts in Poland and Europe. This type of policy change, regardless of whether the end result is one that is more democratic, fails to insulate key institutions from power swings in a polarized political system. This paves the way for continued democratic backsliding at some future point, as using executive power or legal loopholes become the norm.
Finally, Tusk’s coalition believed that they had defeated illiberalism. They failed to understand how perceived inaction would lead the same voters who supported them in 2023 to vote for PiS-backed Karol Nawrocki in the 2025 presidential election. The election was largely expected to yield Civic Platform’s Rafał Trzaskowski as a friendly president that would allow judicial reforms and other key policy promises to finally go through. Instead, the vote functioned as a referendum on Tusk’s government. In a campaign more focused on candidates’ personalities and histories than on their policies, voters, frustrated with coalition infighting and a lack of progress on key election promises, backed Nawrocki. Tusk’s coalition gained a reputation for serving urban elites, by embracing social policies not aligned with the views of many Poles. Democrats in the U.S. have previously made similar mistakes, counting on key demographics to continue supporting them, while dedicating airtime to addressing Trump’s character rather than illustrating a vision for the future. Poland’s example is a reminder that this is a dangerous game, even when seemingly in the lead in polls. As midterms later this year and presidential elections in 2028 engender hopes of addressing democratic backsliding, a future administration will need allies in Congress to implement policy. Furthermore, it will need a plan to actively engage with citizens on its progress and the complications of making policy after Trump 2.0 to avoid losing voter support when policy is unable to be quickly resolved.
As illustrated by recent developments in Polish politics, the U.S. government that comes after Trump will face the challenge of restoring institutions without succumbing to the tools of illiberal governments. For a Democratic government coming into power, these tools, including the overuse of executive orders, may be attractive. However, simply repealing everything Trump has done won’t undo democratic backsliding. It won’t erase the polarization that has led the United States to this point. And it won’t build the resilience our institutions need to face further illiberal challenges down the line. Poland’s experience is also a warning to voters. Repairing weakened institutions is slow and costly; illiberalism is not quite as reversible as it feels at the ballot box. Once democratic guardrails are affected, even well-intentioned successors struggle to restore them.