Bankrupt Ballcarriers? How NFL Policy Limits Running Back Earnings
Data visualization for this article was prepared by Yufei Liu.
The National Football League has a major problem on its hands. Or, at least, the league’s running backs do: they aren’t getting paid like they used to, and the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement is partially to blame.
After begrudgingly playing the 2023-24 season on one-year deals, a contingent of star running backs across the NFL have signed contract extensions since the 2024 free agency signing period opened earlier this month. While recent deals for the likes of Saquon Barkley, Josh Jacobs, and Jonathan Taylor are undoubtedly big wins at an individual level, the ordeal they endured to get there bodes ill for the future of compensation at the running back position.
Although Barkley, Jacobs, and Taylor established themselves among the upper echelon of ball-carriers while playing on cheap, rookie-scale contracts, their teams’ reluctance to hand out big extensions left them fighting uphill battles upon the expiration of their rookie deals in 2023. Disgruntled with the state of negotiations ahead of the 2023 season, all three staged brief and unsuccessful holdouts from training camp that ultimately proved illustrative of running backs’ deflated leverage in the modern player market. In a July 2023 Zoom meeting of the league’s premier running backs, organized by fellow frustrated extension-seeker Austin Ekeler, players reportedly “kicked around ideas” to address their plight while ultimately acknowledging that there’s not much they can do.
Indeed, the data confirms that compensation for running backs is lagging other position groups across the NFL. Figure 1 demonstrates that since the 1990s, average annual salaries for the 5 highest-paid running backs across the league have grown modestly in comparison to compensation for other skill-position players on offense. From being the second-highest paid position group as recently as the 1994 season, the running back position has fallen toward the middle of the pack in 2022.
Figure 1
This compensation trend is particularly puzzling considering running backs’ status as focal points of offensive strategy on the field and as media darlings in sports coverage. Even Christian McCaffrey, the NFL’s best running back, seems underpaid despite signing a solid contract extension in 2020. The San Francisco 49ers’ blockbuster acquisition of McCaffrey via trade during the 2022 season instantaneously vaulted the team to championship contention while serving as premier media fodder for months. Just over a year later, his consistent, dynamic, and explosive play resulted in a streak of 17 straight games with a touchdown, tied for most in NFL history. And yet, McCaffrey’s four-year, $64 million contract will make him just the sixth-highest paid player on the team in 2024, behind the 49ers’ right tackle.
While it’s difficult to pinpoint exactly why the running back market has cooled so substantially, most can agree on a few contributing factors. The first, and most obvious, reason for running backs’ slipping salaries is that the game is shifting—since 2003, NFL average pass-run split has gone up from 53%/47% to 58%/42%, and offenses are having more success than ever moving the ball. The modern NFL is a pass-first league and run-first offenses have become few and far between. A second contributing factor might be that running back talent parity relative to other position groups has made individual production largely replaceable. Following a 2000-2004 zenith of reliance on “workhorse” running backs—players entrusted with nearly every snap at the running back position— NFL teams have increasingly leaned on a group of solid backs to carry the load on the ground. This resurgence of the “running back by committee” approach to the ground game is one piece of evidence that front offices value elite running back play only marginally more than league average play.
Lastly, responsible for delivering repeated blows to opposing linebackers, running backs quickly accumulate physical punishment that can sharply diminish their explosive capacity as they age. Whereas continual success at other positions is rewarded with greater responsibility and lucrative extensions, excellence at the running back position is itself a contributor to rapid athletic decline. The distribution of the best one-season performances in NFL history across the major offensive skill positions attests that, more than any other position group, running backs’ propensity to deliver top-notch value peaks early in their career. Since the 2010 season, standout seasons for running backs are distributed even more tightly around ages 24-26 than before, while quarterbacks are achieving greater longevity due to the premium on quarterback experience and awareness in modern passing offenses.
Figure 2
Figure 3
When combined with the compensation terms dictated by the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), the reality of running backs’ fleeting prime years creates a nightmare scenario for their extension prospects. The 2011 CBA was a victory for players on multiple fronts—for one, it delivered higher salaries to all players, whose share of NFL revenues increased to 47% from 42% under the previous CBA. However, its strict regulation of rookie contracts helps prevent top-end running backs from capitalizing financially on their best seasons. Before 2011, draftees were allowed to negotiate their contracts freely—this practice had allowed these unproven rookies to bargain for increasingly exorbitant compensation packages at the expense of multi-year veterans. After this trend culminated in 2010 first-overall pick Sam Bradford’s signing of a whopping $78 million deal with the St. Louis Rams, the 2011 CBA placated both underpaid veterans and team owners looking to allocate cap space more efficiently. Negotiated between the NFL Players’ Association (NFLPA) and team owners, the agreement instituted the first rookie wage scale, locking in contract terms for rookies based on draft order alone. As a result of the rookie wage scale, annual salaries for top picks suffered tremendously [see Tables 1 and 2], with no exception for running backs [see Table 3].
Despite the benefits which the 2011 CBA delivered to the entire NFL, the shift to a rookie wage scale forces running backs to spend their most productive seasons on low-value contracts. The rookie wage scale stipulates four-year contract terms for all rookies, with a “fifth-year option” for teams to extend first-round picks an additional, cost-controlled year. Since most players enter the league at age 22, this means that running backs are likely beyond their physical prime when they become eligible for contract extensions at age 26 or 27. For running backs, it’s a classic catch-22: in performing at a level deserving of a big contract extension, they are depreciating the value of potential extensions through inevitable wear and tear.
Of course, a revision of rookie wages would do nothing to address the other contributors to running backs’ lagging pay—NFL executives’ preferences for spending at other position groups might not change any time soon. If running backs’ vocal demands do result in changes to the rookie wage scale when the current CBA expires in 2030, it will only give running backs the opportunity to earn more competitive wages while playing at their physical prime. Regardless, if a change to the CBA improves top college running backs’ odds of cashing in on draft day, it would be a big win for the future of the running back position.
Table 1: Contracts of Top 10 Picks in 2010 Draft | |||
Player | Years | Value ($M) | Annual Average ($M) |
Sam Bradford | 6 | 78 | 13 |
Ndamukong Suh | 5 | 68 | 13.6 |
Gerald McCoy | 5 | 63 | 12.6 |
Trent Williams | 6 | 60 | 10 |
Eric Berry | 6 | 60 | 10 |
Russell Okung | 6 | 58 | 9.67 |
Joe Haden | 5 | 50 | 10 |
Rolando McClain | 5 | 40 | 8 |
C.J. Spiller | 5 | 37.5 | 7.5 |
Tyson Alualu | 5 | 28 | 5.6 |
Table 2: Contracts of Top 10 Picks in 2011 Draft | |||
Player | Years | Value ($M) | Annual Average ($M) |
Cam Newton | 4 | 22 | 5.5 |
Von Miller | 4 | 21 | 5.25 |
Marcell Dareus | 4 | 20.4 | 5.1 |
A.J. Green | 4 | 19.6 | 4.9 |
Patrick Peterson | 4 | 18.42 | 4.605 |
Julio Jones | 4 | 16.2 | 4.05 |
Aldon Smith | 4 | 14.4 | 3.6 |
Jake Locker | 4 | 12 | 3 |
Tyron Smith | 4 | 12.5 | 3.125 |
Blaine Gabbert | 4 | 12 | 3 |
Table 3: Notable High-1st Round RB Contracts before and after 2011 |
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Player | Pick # | Year | Years | Value | Annual Average | % of Salary Cap | |
Pre-2011: | Ronnie Brown | 2 | 2005 | 5 | 34 | 6.8 | 7.95% |
Darren McFadden | 4 | 2008 | 6 | 42.01 | 7.00 | 6.04% | |
Adrian Peterson | 7 | 2007 | 5 | 18.55 | 3.71 | 3.40% | |
C.J. Spiller | 9 | 2010 | 5 | 37.5 | 7.5 | 6.10% | |
Ryan Matthews | 12 | 2010 | 5 | 26.65 | 5.33 | 4.33% | |
Marshawn Lynch | 12 | 2007 | 5 | 13.315 | 2.663 | 2.44% | |
Player | Pick | Year | Years | Value | Annual Average | % of Salary Cap | |
Post-2011 | Saquon Barkley | 2 | 2018 | 4 | 31.19 | 7.7975 | 4.40% |
Trent Richardson | 3 | 2012 | 4 | 20.49 | 5.1225 | 4.25% | |
Ezekiel Elliott | 4 | 2016 | 4 | 24.9 | 6.225 | 4.01% | |
Bijan Robinson | 8 | 2023 | 4 | 21.95 | 5.4875 | 2.44% | |
Christian McCaffrey | 8 | 2017 | 4 | 17.24 | 4.31 | 2.58% | |
Todd Gurley | 10 | 2015 | 4 | 13.82 | 3.455 | 2.41% |