Vega v. Tekoh: Miranda Under Fire

After nearly 60 years, the protections established by Miranda v. Arizona are under attack. Miranda v. Arizona helped protect individuals under arrest; for the first time, police officers were required to educate arrestees about their rights and the protections afforded to them. For many, Miranda rights functioned as a first line of defense against self-incrimination. In Vega v. Tekoh, the court held that an individual has no right to sue a police officer who failed to provide a Miranda warning under federal civil rights laws for violating their Fifth Amendment right preventing self-incrimination. Respondent Terence Tekoh was questioned by petitioner Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Carlos Vega in the hospital where Tokeh worked regarding the sexual assault of a patient. Upon carrying out an arrest, Vega failed to read Tekoh his rights under Miranda. v Arizona. Post-interrogation, Tekoh provided a written statement in which he apologized for and admitted to the inappropriate touching of the patient. He was subsequently prosecuted for unlawful sexual penetration. Tekoh was found not guilty of unwanted sexual penetration. After his trial, Tekoh sued Vega under 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking damages for alleged violations of constitutional rights; however, the Court found that Vega had not violated section 42 U.S.C. §1983.

To understand the importance of the Vega decision, one must first examine Miranda v. Arizona. In June 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court held that all criminal suspects must be advised of their rights prior to any interrogation. Since Miranda v. Arizona, the Miranda warning has become an integral part in the interaction between law enforcement and the public. This spring, the Court held that violation of Miranda does not constitute a necessary violation of Fifth Amendment rights, which is in accordance with the Miranda v. Arizona ruling. The Fifth Amendment holds that no individual can be compelled by the government to provide self-incriminating information. The public views Miranda as a way to inform individuals who might be unaware of their rights and legally established protections when interacting with law enforcement entities. In the decision of Vega v. Tekoh, the court claimed that Miranda v. Arizona in no way established that failure to read Miranda rights did not – by itself –  constitute a Fifth Amendment violation. It was argued that an un-Mirandized suspect could self-incriminate without outside influence from a law enforcement officer. While seemingly true, this argument may lead to unforeseen negative consequences. In addition, a §1983 claim must be based on “the deprivation of any rights…secured by… law.” In other words, a valid claim can only be made if an action directly violates some right specifically secured by law. Tekoh could not succeed unless he made the argument that Miranda rules constitute federal law that provides ground for a §1983 claim and that this “law” be expanded to include the right to sue for damages under §1983. The Supreme Court explained that allowing for a §1983 claim would require a federal judge (or jury) to adjudicate a factual question that should have already been decided by a state court. The Supreme Court also pointed out that allowing §1983 suits relating to Miranda claims would cause procedural issues, ultimately concluding that Miranda alone provides sufficient protections.

Vega v. Tokeh has the unfortunate capacity to disproportionately affect people of color and other underprivileged communities. The law enforcement system in the United States has not yet rid itself of racist ties, and as such the implications of this decision must be examined with that in mind. If a police officer knows they will not be held accountable for failing to read an individual their Miranda rights, they may not be encouraged to do so. Miranda v. Arizona was a landmark case, in terms of ensuring that individuals are actively able to protect themselves. This education was specifically beneficial to people of color, as it gave them access to knowledge of their legal rights, something often not found in the formal education of marginalized communities. However, the 1996 Supreme Court ruling did not provide a clear enough definition for what constituted a voluntary confession. The 2000 case, Dickerson v. United States, attempted to correct this by indicating that an individual waving their Miranda rights must do so knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily. Dickerson failed to sufficiently address the lack of clarity, but it did provide added protections for individuals not fully aware of their rights. This set the stage for Vega, which states that an un-Mirandized suspect may unknowingly self-incriminate without undue force or interference. In this instance failure to read Miranda rights does not supposedly violate the Fifth Amendment.

This ruling allows for a significant lack of accountability on the part of officers. It is this lack of accountability that often empowers police officers and the rest of the justice system to disproportionately target communities of color. After George Floyd’s death, we know that it is very difficult to convict police officers in a criminal court, even when they have very obviously committed atrocities. Cases involving failure to read Miranda rights are complex, and criminal proceedings are unlikely to result in a police officer’s conviction. Vega takes things a step further and denies an individual the ability to seek retribution in civil court. A §1983 suit could provide a layer of protection to communities that are already at increased risk for police brutality, lack of due process, and wrongful conviction. This combined with common misconceptions about the justice system may work together to cause more harm than good, specifically for communities of color. There is a common misconception among detainees, and the public, that individuals must always comply with police requests. This very often leads individuals to fall victim to self-incrimination, despite their Fifth Amendment right and Miranda. As such, apparent voluntary waiving of Miranda on the part of a detainee or other modes of self-incrimination may not in fact truly be voluntary. This trend is greater among people who speak English as a second language, and the inability to properly understand Miranda rights is exacerbated. Data suggests that the average person, during an interrogation, cannot knowingly and intelligently waive their rights.  Less than 50% of all detainees can recall being read their Miranda rights prior to interrogation.  People of color are at increased risk of longer, more aggressive interrogations, which in turn puts them at increased risk to confess to crimes they have not committed. The combination of lack of clarity surrounding Miranda and aggressive interrogations leads to an increased risk that a person of color will falsely confess to a crime they had not committed. This helps explain why people of color are at increased risk for false imprisonment. Vega v. Tokeh prohibits individuals from seeking out personal justice in instances where police officers fail to do their job properly or faithfully. However, the implications of the ruling appear to be far more harmful. There is reason to believe that Vega v. Tokeh will also set the precedent that individuals who understandably do not comprehend Miranda will be unable to act if a confession is procured in bad faith. The implications of this case cause further tension between the supposed protections guaranteed by both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and the public’s ability to hold government officials accountable for the standards they violate.