How China’s Zero-Covid Policy Evolved and Failed

In December 2022, China abandoned its draconian Zero-COVID policy (also called Dynamic Zero-COVID Policy), a move that was one of the most dramatic shifts in its coronavirus prevention measures. As the world belatedly welcomes China back, it is important to look back at the series of policy changes from the implementation of the Zero-COVID policy pursued by the Chinese government over the past three years to its abrupt end. An analysis of the “20 prevention and control measure to optimize COVID-19 responses,” the “10 new measures to optimize COVID-19 response,” and their subsequent removal will help to understand the significance of this policy change.

At the beginning of the COVID outbreak in 2020, China implemented the first lockdown since the founding of the State, starting in Wuhan. Although the decision was internationally controversial, there is no doubt that the lockdown and precise epidemic prevention helped China temporarily shield itself from the pandemic’s impact on people’s livelihoods and the economy in the shortest possible time. Compared to the other major economies in 2020, China was the only country to report economic growth. However, the emergence of more transmissible and harmful variants of the coronavirus in 2021 disincentivized China from lifting its special measures. Furthermore, due to prior experience and path dependence in decision making, the official perception of the Zero-COVID policy remained unchanged, regardless of the decline in the harmfulness of the virus itself.

Separately, Chinese officials believed that the goal of the Zero-COVID policy was to put people’s lives, safety, and health first at the lowest social cost, in line with China’s actual conditions and science. Chinese officials also claimed that the country’s reduced economic development in 2020 and 2021 was partly due to the implementation of its Zero-COVID policy. Officials asserted that the long-term positive fundamentals of the Chinese economy would not change and that the Zero-COVID policy showed the country’s adaptive adjustment mechanism against the epidemic. In other words, China’s COVID-related policy highlighted the superiority of their national governance.

On Nov. 11, 2022, the 20 measures were released by the Chinese government to optimize its previous COVID-19 response around the following points:

1. To reduce the duration of the quarantine at designated sites;
2. To impose narrower definitions on individuals who had to be quarantined while adjusting the categories of COVID-19 risk areas;
3. To adjust some situations that once required quarantine at designated sites to home quarantine;
4. To cancel the circuit breaker mechanism for inbound flights and lowered the nucleic acid requirements for those traveling to China;
5. To require more efforts in enhancing medical resources and accelerating the reserve of drugs related to COVID-19 treatment, advancing vaccination in an orderly manner;
6. To urge redoubling efforts to rectify the one-size-fits-all approach and excessive policy steps.

These measures caused a lot of discussion among Chinese citizens who wanted a quicker return to normal life. They hoped for a return to life without regular quarantine, lockdown, mandatory or semi-compulsory requirements for negative nucleic acid results, and without the COVID shaming and fear. However, the 20 measures were difficult to promote in local governments. Some localities did not make corresponding adjustments after the promulgation of the measures, and others enacted more stringent measures than before.

To explain this unusual phenomenon, we must analyze the internal mechanism of past successful implementations of coronavirus prevention measures by the Chinese government. In doing so, we find that the “mobilization campaign” is central to the Chinese government’s implementation of its ideology and policies. There is no doubt that the mobilization campaign quickly forms a nationwide consensus and allows the central government to effectively communicate its will to local governments, requiring them to carry out specific instructions. But there is a downside to this model, namely inertial negligence. Since these mobilization campaigns are essentially path-dependent processes, local officials, fearing accountability for the failure of fulfilling central government directives, impose extreme implementation in accordance with the directions from the central government. Meanwhile, as time progressed, the mobilization campaign created policy inertia at the local level. Officials demonized the coronavirus early in the “mobilization campaign,” utilizing tactics including, but not limited to, misleading propaganda about the virus itself and selective reporting of overseas outbreaks. Moreover, the media acquiesced to or endorsed public shaming of individuals or groups who were diagnosed with COVID or unwilling to submit to harsh COVID measures or vaccination.

During the “mobilization campaign,” nearly all of China fell into a COVID witch hunt. People feared that they would be discriminated against or mistreated if they tested positive, that their itinerary would be published on the internet, that their communities would be in lockdown and they would have difficulty getting necessities, and that their houses would be chained up or secluded behind an iron fence.

Although the 20 measures clearly stated that those who mismanage by overly executing the COVID prevention norms will be pursued in accordance with the law and regulation, they also emphasized that “optimizing and adjusting the COVID-19 response measures does not mean loosening prevention and control against the virus.” Such irreconcilable inconsistency triggered public anger against the Zero-COVID policy itself to a breaking point.

Amidst the chaos, China released the 10 new measures in December 2022, merely one month after the enactment of the 20 measures. The 10 new measures required the relevant departments to rectify the oversimplified or one-size-fits-all approaches and excessive policy steps. The measures also required local administrations curb pointless bureaucratic formalities and faithfully implement prevention and control measures. The measures intended to maximize the protection of life and health and minimize the impact of the pandemic on economic and social development. While a certain level of precautions was required among the 10 new measures, these measures heralded the de facto end of the Zero-COVID policy in terms of local implementation.

Looking back at the past three years of doubt, chaos, anxiety, fear, and overturn, no one knows what awaits China and its people. As the Chinese population shrinks for the first time since the revolution, the future remains uncertain. Geo-political conflicts could further exacerbate internal problems that emerged during the COVID lockdowns. However, one thing is certain: the iron fence for COVID is falling.