Al-Sisi’s Egypt: A Mirage of Democracy

This is derived from an Analytical Politics assignment by Rimjhim Agrawal, Sief Salameh, Jahnvi Agarwal, Riddhi Kankaria.

On Jan. 25, 2011, tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Tahrir Square for a “Day of Revolution” to mark the start of nationwide protests calling for the resignation of Egypt’s autocratic leader, Hosni Mubarak. The protesters endured violent crackdowns and interventions, internet and communication shutdowns — all for the dream of democracy. At long last, Egypt was holding free elections, and in 2012, the people of Egypt elected Mohammed Morsi President. Despite hopes for a democratic awakening in Egyptian politics, a military coup d’état ousted Morsi less than a year later, when Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi installed himself as Egypt’s de-facto leader. What promised to be a liberation quickly transitioned into a prolonged authoritarian government that brutally suppressed any opposition. To understand how Al-Sisi sustains his authoritarian regime, we need to dissect the events that precipitated the protests in Tahrir Square.

Egypt’s modern political landscape can be traced back to the death of Khaled Said at the hands of the police. Egyptians were already discontented with the poor economic conditions of their country. With a 71% unemployment rate among university graduates, rising inflation, hunger, poverty, corruption, and police brutality, it was no surprise that Egyptians revolted against Mubarak and his regime for making living conditions unbearable. The Mubarak regime collapsed after 18 days of continuous protests in Tahrir Square. After the people elected Morsi, however, Egyptians continued to face economic hardships and a widening ideological gap between Islamists and liberals. This polarization was a crucial breaking point for the country’s political future.

Although Egypt’s return to authoritarianism may appear as a coup d’état orchestrated by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, he neither emerged out of thin air, nor did he single-handedly cripple the opposition parties in Egypt’s electoral races. Al-Sisi, like his predecessors, maintains a bilateral relationship with a brutal military force called the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) through financial incentives and shared loyalty. Ironically, it was Morsi who had promoted Al-Sisi to the defense minister and commander positions in the armed forces, forcing senior SCAF members into retirement over a power tussle with the military. Days after Mubarak was toppled, in a move to consolidate control, SCAF presented a draft six-month plan of constitutional revisions to elect a new government. They reserved the bulk of seats for military candidates, leaving only one-third of them for independent candidates. Eventually, they dissolved the parliament itself, forcing Morsi out.

Some critics suggest that Al-Sisi’s actions were impulsive; however, evidence suggests that he tactfully orchestrated Morsi’s fall.

First, Al-Sisi took advantage of the existing religious and political polarization between the government’s opposition groups. During Morsi’s term between February 2011 and June 2013, Al-Sisi instructed military personnel to instigate public demonstrations calling for Morsi’s removal after the civilian council drafted a new constitution. The SCAF used the public’s disapproval to successfully carry out the coup d’état on July 3, 2013. In a mission to suppress all dissenting groups, Al-Sisi’s government takeover relied on repressive and violent tactics. He outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood from partaking in any political or civil society organizing. Penalties for such activities included capital punishment, life imprisonment, and exile. Surprisingly, the heavy censure and police crackdown towards the Brotherhood did not mobilize secular political parties from intervening, as they once did in 2011. Instead, “Egyptians opposed to political Islam began to see democracy as less suitable for their country after the Brotherhood performed well in free elections” (Grewal and Monroe, 2018).

Second, the failed revival from the dismal socioeconomic situation eased the transition back to authoritarianism. Al-Sisi, heir to the IMF’s $12 billion loan program, offered Egyptians the opportunity to trade their political rights for economic stability and growth. Once Al-Sisi took office, he eliminated the public safety net by cutting subsidies and critical support for Egyptians living under harsh economic conditions. Lack of jobs and high living costs had more than 30% of the population surviving on an income of $3.2 a day. In contrast, external debt quadrupled between 2010 and 2021 — reaching an all-time high of $137.85 billion. Public funds that were to be directed into national infrastructure, healthcare, and improving living standards were diverted to the military’s opaque, vast business empire.

Lastly, the Sisi government made all efforts to rid the public memory of any dissent or hope of democracy. The Sisi government controls most of the media landscape, which enables them to spread misinformation and suppress community mobilization. The Press and Publications Law and the penal code of Egypt regulate and govern the press. Under these laws, criticism of the President is punishable by fines or imprisonment.  Egypt is rated as “Not Free” in Freedom in the World 2021, Freedom House’s annual study of political rights and civil liberties. Governmental legitimacy relies on the people’s trust in democratic institutions like the police, the judiciary, and the military. Al-Sisi’s political strategy has been an unbridled assault on human rights designed to quell uprising, and it has dispelled the last remnants of trust or legitimacy in the minds of the Egyptian people.

The U.S. government has continually provided over $1 billion in military support to Egypt’s government each year since the 1980s. In January 2022, the Biden administration attempted to withhold $130 million, which Egypt’s government still obtained by meeting some weak humanitarian standards. A recently approved Constitutional Court law frees Egypt of the need to abide by international court decisions against Egypt or agreements/treaties it has signed — such as the prohibition of detention and torture against activists. The ongoing support for Al-Sisi’s government in the face of a deplorable and deteriorating human rights situation severely undermines Egyptians’ brave struggle for democracy. The international community must put conditions on further loans to Egypt on human rights, political participation, and military control. Military regimes that come to power through coups also return to barracks more quickly when they face condemnation from powerful foreign states and international organizations (Thyne et al. 2018).

Local and state officials must build long-term relationships with SCAF to end bilateral loyalty between the head of state and military leaders. The military needs to be isolated from the political processes to ensure that leadership transitions do not become violent. Additionally, the United Nations Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) official recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood as a legitimate political party in Egypt will diversify the parliamentary elections, galvanize secular groups that have become dormant to reemerge, and help decrease internal Islamophobia. Lastly, the UNHRC should utilize its tools, specifically its international influence and relationships with global organizations, to facilitate international tourism and conscious investment. The UNHRC could employ the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affair’s support to advocate for stimulating and diversifying the Egyptian economy through small and medium businesses, opening the Egyptian market for greater opportunity.

Egyptians continue to struggle for prosperity against an ineffective and corrupt state, a repressive regime that does not allow them to productively use their talent, ambition, ingenuity, and education. Their economic problems and unending poverty are fundamentally rooted in their lack of political rights. Reforming the deep-rooted and decades old political structures will open avenues for the Egyptian people to pursue education, political representation, ideological freedom, and economic prosperity. Egypt needs institutions and policies that allow for a free and competitive market, one that creates space for small and medium businesses to prosper. The government needs to be accountable and responsive to citizens, with increased decentralization of power and broader distribution of political rights.

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