A Ceasefire that Backfired: Examining the Increase in the Killing of Social Leaders in Colombia

Negotiating peace is difficult. However, an equally difficult challenge arises when implementing peace where multiple non-state actors compete for territorial dominance. In “Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace,” economists Mounu Prem, Andrés Rivera, Dario Romero and Juan Vargas found that an increase in the homicides of social leaders in Colombia can be explained, at least partially, by the vacuum of power left by a permanent ceasefire carried out by Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas in their controlled territories.

The ceasefire was not followed by the consolidation of state authority over those areas, allowing other illegal groups to increase their presence by targeting social leaders. The researchers found that this phenomenon is not explained by a differential trend in the general homicide rate and that the killing of social leaders increased in places with weaker state capacity.

During peace negotiations, the government and FARC agreed to a ceasefire that coincided with an unprecedented increase in the killing of social leaders, a practice that has become endemic in Colombia. The authors noted that more than 550 social leaders, the visible figures channeling the demands of their communities before the central government and promoting collective action, were killed in Colombia between 2009 and 2017.

The paper analyzed the increase in the killing of social leaders during the ceasefire period and after the subsequent signature of the final peace agreement. The study used data gathered by the human rights NGO Somos Defensores (“We are Defenders,” in Spanish), which defines a social leader as a person fighting for the human rights of those in local vulnerable communities. The data revealed an increase in killings of social leaders after the ceasefire. The authors also analyzed data on past violence over an extended period as proxy for territorial dominance, which they used to survey the presence of armed groups in the territory, such as neo-paramilitary groups and the ELN guerrilla, that could dispute control of zones liberated by FARC.

Using an econometric model, researchers compared the change in the killing of social leaders in three types of areas: municipalities with FARC members and other illegal groups, municipalities with only FARC presence, and municipalities exposed to other illegal groups but without FARC presence. The model suggested that social leaders were targeted differently after the ceasefire in territories with FARC presence and the presence of other armed actors that could occupy the newly freed spaces.

As potential mechanisms that explain this phenomenon, the authors tested the interaction of the killings with land restitution demands carried out by social leaders under a government program, as well as the distance to the nearest military unit and judicial inefficiency as measures of state capacity. They found a positive relationship with the killings in places with restitution demands and where the judiciary was inefficient.

This paper is part of a growing academic literature on conflict that departs from the traditional debate of “greed versus grievances” to study the central role that state weakness plays in causing and perpetuating violence. In particular, it identifies the uneven presence of the state in a territory as a key determinant of conflict. Additionally, it highlights the importance of building state capacity before, or with, the signing of ceasefires or peace agreements in order to prevent competing groups from filling the vacuum of power left by the withdrawal of a violent actor. To address these issues, the Colombian government should implement comprehensive policies to protect social leaders, given that they are specially targeted by armed actors. Additionally, when designing policies for contexts of state weakness, governments should include measures to prevent beneficiaries from becoming targets of violence.

Article source: Prem, Mounu, Andrés F. Rivera, Dario A. Romero, and Juan F. Vargas. “Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control: The Unintended Consequences of Peace.” Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía, Serie Documentos de Trabajo 218. (2018).

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