Going Solo: Public Backlash to Unilateralism

Although observers and experts alike have been struggling to define the exact nature of the current U.S. administration’s strategy, its emphasis on unilateralism and occasional dismissal of multilateralism is apparent. In fact, a common idea suggests that resorting to unilateralism, bluntly understood as the will to “go it alone” and circumventing either international partners or Congress, increases the perception of a leader’s strength and authority. However, while researchers have generally focused on the executive or the president’s use of unilateralism, few have analyzed public responsiveness to the use of unilateral powers to achieve a policy. Indeed, beyond the usual association of unilateralism and strength or even vitality, what is the measurable effect of presidential unilateral decision making on the public?

In a recent paper, Andrew Reeves (Washington University in St. Louis) and Jon C. Rogowski (Harvard University) investigated these questions to shed light on how the use of unilateralism as a political process affects public evaluations of both the president and his policies. To better measure this effect which is seldom addressed in preexisting research, the authors presented evidence from two different studies: a series of survey experiments they conducted and a detailed analysis of data collected from a 2015 national survey. They found that the use of unilateral powers by the president is costly in the sense that it is detrimental both to the president’s image and to the public perception of the policy being unilaterally implemented.

Trying to compare two identical policy outcomes reached through different means sounds tempting but it does create a potential strategic selection bias—presidents choosing the unilateral path only when confident it will not hurt them or their policy. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to find such identical instances to compare in the first place. The three population-based survey experiments designed by Reeves and Rogowski avoid this epistemological trap. By randomly assigning fictional presidential candidates’ distinct policy goals to one of three conditions—unilateral condition, legislative condition, or unspecified for the control group—they succeeded in conducting a controlled experiment in compliance with the demands of internal validity. The notion of internal validity refers to “how well” a scientific experiment is conducted and the experimental protocol respected. Moreover, the association of candidates’ fictional policy objectives, which were legalizing the use of medical marijuana, reducing taxes on corporations, and deploying U.S. troops abroad, to different types of political processes yielded statistically positive results. Indeed, comparing the responses between the unilateral and legislative conditions and between unilateral and control conditions revealed a pattern of differences that were systematically negative and statistically significant. Reeves and Rogowski ultimately found that resorting to unilateralism as an instrument of power actually decreased support for a candidate.

Are those findings valid in the real world where actual policies are at stake? The second study conducted by the researchers, an analysis of a 2015 survey, attempted to answer this question. Using a survey asking respondents whether they approved of a series of policies implemented through presidential unilateral action as a basis, Reeves and Rogowski discovered that the probability of supporting an executive order when opposed to the use of unilateral powers was significantly lower than when supporting the latter. In other words, focusing on real-world policy outcomes revealed that public attitudes toward unilateralism significantly influence how policies implemented through unilateral means are evaluated and, by extension, how the presidency is perceived.

This analysis has broad implications for policy makers and members of the executive branch. It highlights a somewhat counter-intuitive reality: that being a strongman or a vital statesman does not mean going it alone. On the contrary, public aversion for unilateral policy implementation tells another story. By relatively constraining executive powers, precisely because of the heavy cost of going against it, American public wariness toward unilateralism invites political leaders to come to a consensus and to govern through regular legislative processes. This is a lesson to keep in mind at a time when many throughout the globe call for more “authoritative” and decisive leaders, able to make tough decisions even at the expense of democratically elected national parliaments accused of being obstacles to “true,” unilaterally decided change.

Article source: Reeves, Andrew, and Rogowski, Jon C. “The Public Cost of Unilateral Action”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 62, Issue 2 (2018): 424-40.

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