Misperceptions of Covert Action

Discussion surrounding covert action and “hybrid” warfare has recently become a topic of intense interest in academic and policy circles. Russian influence on the 2016 U.S. elections, the increased use of special forces, and the proliferation of cyberwarfare are just a few timely examples of fields relatively devoid of past critical analysis.

But while these discussions have evoked newly-formed debates regarding covert action and its efficacy, a pervasive misconception of key terms and assumptions within the field has potentially obscured the discourse surrounding covert action. The most notable of these misconceptions is of the phrase “plausible deniability,” a term commonly perceived as an essential attribute to covert action in both academic definitions and state doctrine. However, evidence would suggest that much of what the general public (and even governments themselves) view as covert activity is hardly plausibly deniable at all.

In a recent article, Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich, prominent scholars on secrecy in politics, venture to challenge these current assumptions regarding hybrid warfare and covert action. The paper argues that the idea of plausible deniability is ambiguous and misleading at best. Through historical examples, the authors show that covert action undertaken by states is often neither plausibly deniable nor undetected by a state’s adversaries. These findings can potentially provide insight into the logic of interventionism among states in the 21st century.

Cormac and Aldrich assert that the very nature of these seemingly secret affairs has resulted in a misconstrued perception surrounding states’ utilization of covert action. Contrary to popular opinion, plausible deniability is hardly an existing concept in itself – and it hardly ever was. Their article references recent history, particularly the perceived secrecy of the Cold War era. Even during this epoch, in which the world’s leading superpowers participated in a vast array of covert operations, espionage, proxy wars, and hybrid warfare, many of these “secret” actions were rarely plausibly deniable. Both sides were often well aware of one another’s “covert” operations, a notion that the authors define as “implausible deniability.”

Moreover, not only does the evidence demonstrate that adversaries are frequently aware of each other’s covert actions, but it reveals that opposing sides will often implicitly agree to not publicize the other’s operations. This type of tacit collusion between adversaries indicates that the current academic and doctrinal notion towards plausible deniability is ill-conceived. Cormac and Aldrich argue that the reasoning behind these seemingly counter-intuitive affairs lies in the shortcomings of experts’ abilities to accurately conceptualize the goals and efficacy of covert operations.

The authors continue to suggest that covert action is utilized by leaders as a communicative measure and a tool for “strategic ambiguity.” This multi-functional purpose can be exploited by a leader in response to the influences of the current political environment. States can paradoxically draw attention to their use of covert action (and frequently do so) as a maneuver to communicate resolve to both internal and external actors. Whether utilized to avoid escalation of conflict with adversaries abroad, or to prove legitimacy to hawkish domestic naysayers questioning a leader’s toughness, the ambiguity of covertness allows for a broad range of communication.

The paper concludes that the idea of plausible deniability has little place in the 21st century, if it ever had a place at all. This is due in large part to the increasing visibility of covert action through factors such as media coverage and the increase of both special forces and private military companies throughout the world. One may be tempted to extend this notion to deduce that states’ utilization of covert operations will wane in the coming years. However, the authors firmly state that this “lack of plausibility… does not spell the end of covert action.” Rather than limit covert action to the necessary assumption of plausible deniability, both academic and policy circles alike can recast these assumptions as that of implausible deniability through the means of “unacknowledged activity.” In embracing the concept of implausible deniability, states exploit a method of warfare that is historically met with impunity. Policy makers can seek to exploit the advantages of covert action in the 21^st century while also accurately assessing an adversary’s proclivity to conduct covert and hybrid warfare.

Article source: Rory Cormac, Richard J. Aldrich; “Grey is the new black: covert action and implausible deniability,” International Affairs, Vol. 94, Issue 3, (2018): 477–494.

Featured photo: cc/(Natthapon, photo ID: 914921458, from iStock by Getty Images)