Partisan Judicial Elections Can Lead to Lower-Quality Judges

When Yvette McGee Brown became a justice on the Ohio Supreme Court, she was repeatedly ranked as “highly recommended” by the Ohio State Bar Association. However, when she ran for reelection, she was defeated by Sharon Kennedy, a judge scored as “not recommended.” Following the election, journalists suggested that more Irish and “white-sounding” surnames on ballots might attract more votes than good ratings.

With regard to cases like this one, Claire S.H. Lim and James M. Snyder Jr.’s recent study explores how certain information, particularly revealed party affiliation, can impact judicial elections across different electoral systems. After analyzing data on election results and judicial evaluations from 39 US states between 1990 and 2010, the authors claim that different electoral rules cause voters to use information on candidates differently.

Lim and Snyder attest that results in partisan elections—where the candidates’ political affiliation is shown on the ballot—resemble partisan patterns observed in previous federal and state elections. In other words, there is a strong correlation between the “normal Democrat vote” for other offices (such as the US President, senators, or governors) and the Democrat vote for judges. On the contrary, in states where political affiliation is not revealed on the ballot, electoral results do not exhibit partisan patterns.

The authors examine the extent to which the quality of candidates is a good predictor of the outcomes of judicial elections. To address whether a candidate is well qualified to perform the duties and responsibilities of the office, the study measures quality as a function of rankings published by the Bar Associations of the analyzed states, which are assumed to be objective. Low-ranked candidates are considered “unqualified,” while high-ranked candidates are considered “qualified.” Then, it assumes that, if voters voted based on candidates’ true suitability, it could be expected that only well qualified candidates would win judicial races. However, the analysis of the data reveals that quality is not the main determinant of the outcomes of these elections.

Altogether, the study finds that, in a large majority of these cases (94 percent), unqualified candidates lose judicial elections. However, some electoral systems are more effective at preventing the election of unqualified individuals. While one half of the elected “unqualified” candidates won races through partisan systems, only one fourth did so through nonpartisan systems. This means that baffling situations like the defeat of Justice McGee Brown are more likely to happen in states with partisan systems (such as Texas, Alabama, or Kansas), than in states with nonpartisan electoral rules (such as California, Florida, or Maryland).

To analyze information about how candidates influence electoral results, Lim and Snyder examine the change in turnout rates across systems. According to their findings, more people (83 percent) cast votes in judicial elections under partisan rules than under nonpartisan rules (76 percent).

The authors claim that higher participation in partisan elections does not necessarily reflect a broader public knowledge of the candidates running for office. Rather, it suggests that, under partisan systems, voters are more likely to cast votes based solely on easy-to-access information printed on the ballot. Meanwhile, nonpartisan systems force voters to look for additional sources of information on candidates’ quality.

Given that some counties have more newspapers covering elections than others, Lim and Snyder assume that voters in those counties are better informed and would be more likely to choose qualified candidates. Nonetheless, the study finds that this is true only under nonpartisan systems. The authors hypothesize that, even when voters might have been exposed to insightful information on the candidates—for instance, from independent publications like BallotReady or Ballotpedia—under partisan systems, information on party affiliation seems to be a more likely vote determinant than other sources.

In a country that is becoming increasingly politically polarized, the findings of this study help us to assess crucial questions about judicial quality and the democratic process. Therefore, the question for optimal systems must recognize that choosing a particular set of rules for judicial elections is not a trivial decision. Rules have a major influence on the outcome of elections.

Article Source: Lim, Claire S.H., and James M. Snyder Jr. “Is More Information Always Better? Party Cues and Candidate Quality in U.S. Judicial Elections,” Journal of Public Economics 158 (2015): 107-123.

Featured Photo: cc/(City of Fort Collins, CO)