Creating Jobs to End War

What can nations do with ex-fighters after a war? When job opportunities are scarce, former fighters might end up returning to illegal work or some kind of mercenary fighting. For this reason, it is typical to see countries in transitional contexts develop Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) programs that have a heavy employment component—a job training program, for example. But do these programs really work?

Christopher Blattman and Jeannie Annan address this question in “Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State.” They measure the impact of an employment program for high-risk ex-fighters in Liberia used by the nonprofit organization Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

AOAV offers ex-combatants training in agriculture (vegetable farming or pig and poultry husbandry), counseling and life skill classes, and packages of tools and supplies that are useful for an initial push into the industry. Blattman and Annan perform a randomized control trial to test the efficacy of this program. They randomly divide ex-soldiers who applied to the program into two equal groups with the same characteristics: a treatment group with individuals who received benefits, and a control group with those who did not receive the benefits. The authors compare the outcomes of the treatment group with the outcomes of the control group.

The analyses show that the program is partially effective. The number of ex-combatants engaged in farming or animal husbandry is higher in the treatment group—with 77 percent of the beneficiaries participating, as opposed to 61 percent of the non-beneficiaries—as is the number of hours spent doing agricultural activities (four more hours per week). Even though ex-combatants did not abandon illegal activities—i.e. they still combined agriculture with illegal mining—the number of hours dedicated to illegal activities was lower for the treatment group (11.9 hours per week) than for the control (15.6 hours per week).

On the other hand, according to Blattman and Annan, the program does not effectively socialize ex-combatants. While they do not discuss re-socialization in much depth, they explain that the program does not break military chains of command and does not change the qualities of the participants’ circles of friends. The program also does not affect democratic attitudes or attitudes against violence.

Two exogenous events occurred that affected the project. First, a short conflict occurred in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire between November 2010 and March 2011. This generated an external shock to the program, as there was suddenly a demand for mercenaries. The authors use this to compare the reactions of the subjects to the new demand for mercenaries. Even though none of those in the sample went to Cote d’Ivoire, those who participated in AOAV showed less interest in going; the share of ex-combatants willing to work as mercenaries was 51 percent lower in the treatment group.

Second, due to an external commercial problem, chicks and piglets were not available in Liberia, so AOAV imported them. The animals did not survive the journey, so AOAV promised cash transfers to those in the animal husbandry program as replacements. Those in vegetable farming still received the seeds and other equipment. The researchers compare the two sub-groups and find that the reduction in illegal activities is significantly larger for those who expect future cash transfers than for those who receive in-kind support. In summary, the program was effective in shifting ex-combatants to less illegal activity. Moreover, to reduce the number of combatants involved in illegal activities, ongoing incentives might be more effective than a one-time transfer of capital.

The article elucidates the limitations of these types of interventions: Providing a labor market is not enough for socializing ex-fighters. Even though Blattman and Annan do not delve into what they mean by re-socialization, the study is useful to suggest that socio-political transformations require more than an adequate labor market. Breaking violent social attitudes, and increasing democratic culture among ex-combatants, requires other comprehensive and multi-disciplinary interventions.

Context matters, and not every country is Liberia, but some of these lessons may be useful for other transitional countries.

Article Source: Blattman, Christopher, and Jeannie Annan. “Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State.” Social Science Research Network 2015.

Featured Photo: cc/(International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center)