How Dictators Adapt to Modernity

When a despot is overthrown, a predictable and ritualized series of short-term events begin to unfold: the tyrannical ruler’s demise is celebrated by the distressed masses, and an outpouring of secrets that kept dissidents confined to hidden torture cells is exposed. For a brief moment, it seems as though the exceptional and brutal nature of the tyrannical rule that tipped society over the edge could never again be possible. Throughout history, the worst of tyrants have been iron-fisted leaders who violently squelched the slightest signs of political independence or criticism of their absolute authority.

Yet, as societies have evolved in an era of mass information, so too have the dictators who must learn to adapt their various controls on power. Once, it was easy to caricaturize dictators as ruthless, Machiavellian rulers, of which there are undoubtedly still many today. Most notable of these are Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad, whose resistance to a popular revolution in Syria at the end stages of the Arab Spring has since led to the unraveling of the state, and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, leader of the most isolationist regime in the world. Today, however, there is a need for a more intricate and complex depiction of the new autocrat. Prior to the current upheaval in Syria, even Assad was aware that violent repression was the last resort in maintaining a four-decade-long, autocratic regime crystallized by his father Hafez Al-Assad.

The primary question that academics Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman seek to answer in “How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism” is the following—how do modern dictators thrive for as long as they do? What intrinsic qualities must dictators convey to the people they seek to control?

When Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini rose to power, the driving force was one of mass terror coupled with ideology. Today, however, Guriev and Treisman assert that dictators instead convince their populations that they are highly competent leaders through censorship, propaganda cooptation of the elite, and, as a last resort, violent repression. Guriev and Treisman explain that dictators signal their competency by exploiting the “globalized media and sophisticated technology of the 21^st century.”

It is therefore unsurprising that autocrats invest heavily in state-sponsored media, propaganda, and media censorship tools in order to signal to the public that their standard of living, as well as their social, political, and economic opportunity, is intact. Instead of abolishing independent media all together, which signals direct repression of speech, modern autocrats seek to limit its use.

For example, Egypt’s deposed autocrat Hosni Mubarak endeavored to crack down on dissent, which was pouring in through audio-visual media outlets, by attempting to create the National Agency for Regulation of Audio and Visual Broadcast. The aim of the new government-regulated media was to provide a policing code of ethics, monitored by both national security and military intelligence officials, used to impose harsh punitive fines on dissidents.

The despot further advances perceptions of his competency by simulating democracy and coopting the country’s elites through patronage or material benefits. While censorship and cooptation are substitutes for each other, both can act as complements to propaganda. Sergei and Treisman highlight the example of Iran, which has the world’s most stringent limits on internet usage and content but engages in less cooptation of its elite. Conversely, Morocco’s royal family exerts far less control over the internet but finds the cooptation of its elite more effective in creating an air of competency.

But what happens when the modern autocrat’s signals to the public fail? Citizens combine information received from the state media, independent media, and their own quality of life to gauge their leader’s competency. When such information fails to convince them, they engage in an active revolution or uprising to seek an alternative leader. Members of the elite who are not coopted also prefer a new alternative, so long as they have the support of the masses—such was the case in the later stages of the Egyptian uprising. Violent repression is therefore the last resort of the despot whose power is unraveling and who seeks to retain it using brute force and terror.

 

Article Source: How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism. Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman. NBER Working Paper, April 2015.

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