Creating Self-Enforcing Democracy: Fraud, Protest, and the Role of International Observers

In recent decades, elections have become increasingly common worldwide and are recognized as among the most important measures of government accountability. But when even the most authoritarian and corrupt regimes use elections to legitimize their rule, the reliability of election results is not a given in many cases. International observers are often employed in an attempt to provide citizens with increased information regarding the validity of the election process. In a recent article, entitled “Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation,” Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov investigate the extent to which the presence of election observers affects the likelihood that citizens will accept the results.

The motivation behind this discussion is the goal of self-enforcing democracies, which Hyde and Marinov suggest are most likely to develop when governments are motivated to hold clean elections. This requires that governments fear the potential protest that might follow a fraudulent election, while also knowing that if elections are held in a free and fair manner, opposition will abide by the results.

The authors of this study consider election monitors as having the potential to contribute to each of these conditions. Credible allegations of cheating may galvanize citizens to participate in protests, overcoming problems of collective action. On the other hand, a favorable statement from election monitors may discourage what the authors refer to as “sore loser” protests.

Using regression analysis and the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) data set, the authors test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the presence of election monitors will make protest less likely. The second is that in the event that observers give a negative report regarding the fairness of elections, protests will not only be more likely but will also last for a longer period of time.

Hyde and Marinov also control for other variables that might affect the probability of protest or fraud such as a past history of protest in a given nation or large gains on the part of opposition parties. In their analysis, the researchers argue that both of their hypotheses are supported.

The testing of the first hypothesis, that the presence of election observers will result in lower rates of process, centers on the increased prevalence of observers in the Post-Cold War period. Comparing the period from 1960 to 1992 to that of 1992 to 2006, the researchers find a drop of nearly six percentage points in the incidence of protest. They credit this change in large part to the presence of observers.

The effects of observers are most noticeable in cases where one would normally expect protests. In countries with a history of protest and in which concerns have been expressed prior to an election, a negative report is associated with an increase of twenty-two percentage points in the likelihood that a protest will occur. As for the duration of protests, the researchers find that when both domestic and international observers issue negative reports, protests last an average of ten days. When allegations of fraud come only from domestic forces, the average length of protest is only six days.

While this study addresses the rather narrow question of how election monitors affect the likelihood of protests, it also points to several other important questions that bear investigating. Hyde and Marinov focus on the presence of “credible” observers. But as the authors acknowledge, even those monitors with strong reputations for reliability may not always carry out their duties in an objective manner. In such cases the basic informational problems that surround potentially fraudulent elections may persist.

While the use of elections has spread to nations across the globe, many questions remain regarding their accuracy and legitimacy. Investigations like that of Hyde and Marinov can provide important insight into the affects and value of tools such as election observation in the democratic process.

Article Source: Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation, Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov. International Organization, Vol. 68 Issue 2, March 2014, pp 329 – 359.

Feature Photo: cc/(Stuart Boreham)