Ignoring Successful Practices: A Case Study of Michelle Rhee and William Bratton

Here is a story you might be familiar with: Passionate policy makers take office, but discover change is easier said than implemented. In a recent article in Public Administration Review, Robert Maranto and Patrick J. Wolf analyze two cases in which policy entrepreneurs enacted significant changes in city government. Both reforms were successful; however, the aggressive nature of the reforms jeopardized the career of both individuals and inhibited the diffusion of their reforms to other cities. The authors identify the innovations implemented by New York City’s police commissioner William Bratton and Washington, DC’s chancellor of schools Michelle Rhee. They analyze how the reforms isolated Rhee and Bratton, eventually leading to their removal from public office.

Public organizations typically promote internally. However, New York City Mayor Rudy Guiliani and DC Mayor Adrian Fenty defied precedent by recruiting candidates through unconventional channels. In 1994 Mayor Giuliani recruited William Bratton to serve as police commissioner. Bratton had experience heading police departments in the region but had never served in the New York Police Department (NYPD). Mayor Fenty’s promotion of Michelle Rhee to chancellor of District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) in 2007 was also unconventional. While Rhee had fifteen years of education experience, she never worked in DCPS and lacked administrative experience.

Bratton and Rhee both supported innovative practices in their respective fields. Bratton focused on modernizing police practice. He increased the number of arrests for minor crimes and implemented CompStat, a program that provides real-time crime reports. He also encouraged disagreement within discussion to eliminate attitudes of superiority. Similarly, Rhee made massive organizational changes in DCPS. She fired over seven hundred underperforming instructional staff and replaced half of the District’s principals and administrative staff.

According to the authors, policy reformers are successful only under a supportive administration, and Rhee and Bratton both enjoyed strong support from their mayors. Mayor Giuliani gave Bratton the resources and authority needed to make drastic changes to NYPD, and Mayor Fenty reduced the power of the school board and granted Rhee unilateral authority to replace principals.

The authors document how the withdrawal of this support eventually led to Bratton’s and Rhee’s downfalls. Bratton’s methods led to a steep and rapid decrease in the city’s homicide rate. However, Bratton’s growing popularity made him a political threat to Mayor Giuliani and concerns over the propriety of a book deal eventually led to his resignation. Rhee’s success relied on the support of Mayor Fenty. However, her reforms were politically unpopular, and she was dismissed after Mayor Fenty was defeated in the 2010 election.

Maranto and Wolf offer four reasons for why Rhee’s and Bratton’s aggressive approaches were not quickly duplicated in other cities. First, Rhee and Bratton incorporated data-based management before it became a norm, and they were thus deemed radicals. Second, aggressive reform angers the public; therefore, a reformer’s ability to affect change depends on securing a strong leadership position. Third, most public organizations continue to promote internally. However, external recruiting promotes the circulation of modern techniques and is necessary to implement permanent policy change. Finally, policy reformers must be given unquestionable control over their agencies. Without this discretion, subordinates can undermine the leader’s goals. If these conditions are not met, drastic reform cannot be sustained.

The authors conclude by offering insight as to when these conditions for successful reform will be met. Success requires public awareness of required changes before reform is implemented; the public must understand the actions and potential outcomes. Furthermore, academics must study similar cases and teach future reformers to copy the methods of successful policy entrepreneurs. These practices will allow policy reformers to avoid political resistance and produce significant changes.