Let’s Make a Deal: An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations

In February 2013, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), an executive order that significantly increased US sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran. In response, President Ahmadinejad of the Republic of Iran stated his willingness to return to the negotiation table on nuclear weapons. Ahmadinejad’s position reopens the question of the viability of a nuclear deal between the United States and Iran.

In a 2012 paper, “Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” researchers James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh introduce a graphical framework to illustrate the potential “zone of possible agreement” between Iran and the United States. Rather than concentrating on tactics and strategy, the negotiation analysis centers on the design of the potential deals and the “setup” under which the negotiation takes place. Their analytical model “relates input assumptions about the parties’ interests, their no-deal options, and possible deals” to graphically illustrate a range of potential outcomes.

One of the most revealing aspects of the authors’ analytical framework is its suggestion that, under the current state of affairs, no zone of possible agreement exists. At present, the most the United States is willing to concede is at odds with the minimum amount of nuclear capacity that Iran is willing to accept. The United States insists that Iran must, at a minimum, stop its uranium enrichment program. Recognizing this gulf, the authors argue, “The failure by multiple parties via a variety of negotiation processes to make serious progress suggests…the absence of an underlying zone of possible agreement.”

Given that no zone of possible agreement currently exists, the authors suggest that the US place less emphasis on offering a wide range of potential deals to Iran and prioritize influencing “the setup” under which these deals would occur. In other words, the authors recommend the adoption of a multi-faceted strategy that imposes costs, designs incentives, and redraws red lines on the Iranian regime to create a zone of possible agreement.

Sebenisu and Singh argue that previous diplomatic strategies toward Iran have failed for a variety of reasons: the United States downplayed the threat of military force, imposed economic sanctions on non-critical Iranian markets, and applied sanctions only sporadically. Using their analytical framework, the authors argue that a successful costs-incentives strategy should meet the following three criteria: the strategy must be credible, it must have a meaningful impact on important Iranian markets, and “it must be of sufficient magnitude relative to the value Iran places on its nuclear program.”

Sebenius and Singh’s analysis reminds readers that diplomatic strategies should not only concentrate on crafting deals, but also on changing the status quo. Despite the reemerging possibility of nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran, it may nonetheless be time for the United States to refocus its strategy.

Feature Photo: cc/Taniwha