Exploring the Changing Dynamics in U.S. Public Opinion toward Israel

The fractured relationship between U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu has received a great deal of media coverage in recent years. In a January 2013 article, the New York Times compares the heads of state to a “couple in a loveless marriage.” Recent research suggests, however, that the tumultuous relationship between the U.S. and Israel may extend beyond the diplomatic realm.

In a 2012 paper published by the International Journal of Public Opinion Research, “Religious Beliefs, Elite Polarization, and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: The Partisan Gap in American Public Opinion toward Israel,” author Ammon Cavari, a faculty member at the Interdisciplinary Center of Herzliya, Israel, explores the role religious and political beliefs have played in the growing gap in U.S. partisan support for Israel.

The author compiles data from 44 different surveys over a period of 42 years (from 1967 to 2009) to test for significant effects on “sympathies with Israel.” The data show that, over the last 40 years, support for the state of Israel among self-identified Democrats has decreased, dropping from 62 percent in 1967 to 51 percent in 2009. Conversely, among self-identified Republicans, support has increased from 60 percent in 1967 to 80 percent in 2009.

The author uses time series data to conduct linear and logistic regressions to understand the growing cleavage along partisan lines. His models seek to test the flowing hypotheses: (1) “the increased support for Israel among Republicans is explained by the alignment of evangelicals with the Republican Party” and (2) “elite polarization on foreign policy in the last decade expanded the partisan gap in public opinion towards Israel.”

In support of the first hypothesis, Cavari finds that the “odds that a Republican who is Protestant will sympathize with Israel are three to one,” almost twice their level of support in 1988. The author attributes this increase in support to the shifting ideology of the Protestant Church, which, he argues, has seen both a surge of fundamentalism and evangelism since the 1980’s and a realignment with the Republican Party.

In support of the second hypothesis, the author finds that “an increase in one percentage point in Congressional polarization increases the Israel gap between Republican and Democratic identifier by .14 points.” This effect intensifies with the inclusion of Evangelical Christians: “A one percentage point increase in the attachment of Evangelical Christians with the Republican Party increases the Israel gap by .21 points.”

The “aggregate effect” of Cavari’s regressions shows that Evangelical Christians’ realignment with the Republican Party has increased conservative support for Israel, and that “the polarization in American politics on domestic and foreign policies has further expanded this gap.” If these findings are correct, it will be interesting to see how the partisan cleavages play out at the foreign policy level. As both Obama and Netanyahu begin a second term, a divided U.S. public may exacerbate the problems already present in their leaders’ “loveless marriage.”

Feature Photo: cc/(Johnk85)