Decisions, Divisions, and Discontent: Reforming Lebanon’s Electoral Procedures

As other countries in the region struggle to realize nascent forms of democracy, Lebanon is seeking to improve its electoral procedures. Arda Arsenian Ekmekji explores the proposed changes in a recent Aspen Institute publication, “Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon.”

Lebanon is a democratic republic with a multi-confessional society; elected members of parliament choose a president every six years. Current electoral law, established in 1943, dictates confessional representation in parliament by proportional allocation, i.e. each religious minority receives a specific number of seats. Home to only 4.3 million people, the country includes 18 religious minority groups. While parties across the political spectrum question the system’s efficacy, it is almost inevitable that any new electoral system will involve some level of discontent and compromise.

Ekmekji discusses three possible scenarios for the 2013 legislative election. First, Lebanese policymakers could maintain the status quo. Current parliamentary election law dictates a majoritarian vote with five major election districts, 26 sub-districts, 128 members of parliament, and a voting age of 21. Ekmekji emphasizes two main points of contention: the Taif Agreement and districting issues. The Taif Agreement, a 1990 reform that ended the country’s civil war, increased the number of parliamentary seats and maintained an equal division between Christians and Muslims. Although the Agreement directs parliament to pass an election law free of sectarian restrictions, policymakers have yet to do so. Moreover, many argue that gerrymandering plagues contemporary districting regulations.

Alternatively, policymakers could adopt the recommendations of the Boutros Commission, or the National Commission on Electoral Law. Formed in 2005, the Commission proposes reducing the voting age to 18, requiring a gender quota on all election lists, and allowing expatriates to vote. Most significantly, the Commission recommends the adoption of a mixed electoral system, wherein a number of parliamentary seats are elected on a majoritarian basis, while other seats remain subject to the proportional process. Policymakers shelved the Commission’s proposal in July 2006 in the wake of the Israeli War. Demographics and costs surrounding religiously skewed youth populations and expatriate voting, however, may compromise the proposal’s impartiality and viability.

In October 2011, Interior Minister Marwan Charbel put forth the most recent reform proposal. Minister Charbel’s proposal covers most of the reforms in the Boutros Commission’s recommendations, but does not reduce the voting age. In addition, it readjusts the logistics of the proportionate voting system and seeks to define 10 to 14 “medium” districts. Ekmekji outlines potential pitfalls of Charbel’s proposal, particularly the lack of specificity regarding district design, candidate assignment, and current policymakers’ roles in implementing the suggested changes.

Ultimately, Ekmekji recommends the implementation of the Boutros Commission’s proposal. Given Lebanon’s unique demographic makeup and existing constitution, the author believes a hybrid system is the solution. To ensure a smooth transition, Ekmekji recommends the changes be adopted over several election cycles, so that institutions can adapt.

While Lebanon has come a long way in reforming its government relative to some of its neighbors, the path ahead for policymakers remains lengthy and uncertain. The economic and political repercussions of regional instability have shifted the Lebanese government’s priorities, and there remains the possibility that electoral system reform could prompt mass demonstrations and revive internal hostilities.

Feature Photo: cc/nathanm