

Beliefs in Foreign Policy Goals and American Citizens' Support for Foreign Aid

Dukhong Kim¹

Abstract

This study examines the role of beliefs in foreign policy goals in accounting for American citizens' support for foreign aid to various countries. Previous studies on public opinion on foreign policy showed the existence of organized and structured beliefs among the mass public. But few studies explore the effect of these beliefs in goals on American citizens' policy preferences. Based on the theoretical proposition that individuals are motivated by goals and principles, this study tests the effect of these beliefs on citizens' support for foreign aid. Two prominent goals that this study explores are humanitarianism and domestic interests. They represent goals of traditional idealism and realism. Results show that, in addition to commonly accepted isolationism, these two beliefs drive citizens' support for foreign aid. Those individuals who believe in humanitarianism are more likely to support foreign aid, while those individuals who care about domestic interests are less likely to support such aid. Furthermore, more sophisticated individuals tend to be able to use a belief in goals more effectively than less sophisticated individuals in accounting for their support for foreign aid.

Key Words: *Foreign Aid, American Public Opinion, Foreign Policy Goals, Humanitarianism, Domestic Interest, Idealism, Realism*

¹ Department of Political Science, Florida Atlantic University, USA. E-mail address: dkim4@fau.edu

Introduction

In explaining how the mass public forms opinions or makes decisions on policies, two competing theories exist. One tradition originates from scholars (Almond 1950; Converse 1964; Lippmann 1922), who raised questions about the capability of the mass public to make stable, consistent, and reasonable choices. Converse (*ibid*) argued that except for a few highly sophisticated segments of the mass public, citizens do not have belief systems with which they can develop consistent and coherent attitudes regarding domestic and foreign policy. The other theoretical tradition approaches the same issue more positively. These scholars (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Kinder 1983; Page and Shapiro 1992; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991) argue that citizens can overcome the limitations of knowledge or lack of capacity and form stable, consistent and reasonable opinions with the help of values or heuristics. Similarly, scholars (e.g., Chittick et al. 1995; Richman et al. 1997; Wittkopf 1990; Holsti 1992; Nincic 2008) who study public opinion on foreign policy suggest that the mass public's opinion on foreign policy is structured and organized along some dimensions of beliefs. Although the shadow of pessimism still remains in evaluating the public's capacity to function as decent and responsible citizens in a democracy, most scholars pursue their studies based on this optimistic proposition.

This paper examines the effect of the mass public's foreign policy beliefs in goals on their support for foreign aid on the basis of this optimistic perspective. As the evidence accumulates of the existence of belief systems and the prominence of foreign policy beliefs in goals as significant elements of belief systems, we need to deepen our understanding of the effect of these beliefs in goals on public opinion. Instead of asking about the existence of belief systems, it is better to ask what types of beliefs matter in shaping Americans' foreign policy opinions or attitudes, how abstract ideals and national interests account for individuals' choices and attitudes, and whether sophisticated individuals are different from less sophisticated ones in using values to form attitudes.

Previous Studies on Americans' Foreign Policy Attitudes

Studies (Bardes and Oldendick 1978; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995; Holsti 1992; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Richman, Malone and Nolle 1997; Wittkopf 1986) of the mass public's attitudes on foreign policy suggest that individuals' foreign policy attitudes are structured and organized. They show that although people do not have ideological constraints, as Converse (1964) argued, they can organize their

attitudes by depending on values or political predispositions. Furthermore, citizens employ multi-dimensional beliefs in foreign policy goals to organize their attitudes. According to the studies, foreign policy beliefs such as isolationism, militarism, liberal internationalism, or anticommunism are primary examples of beliefs that have contributed to structuring individuals' foreign policy attitudes.

In elaborating the structure of belief systems among the public, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) argue that the structure of public belief systems are organized in a triple hierarchy, core values are located at the top and are connected to intermediate level values (or postures) which links to specific policies preferences². The postures directly constrain policy preferences – defense spending, nuclear-arms policy, international trade, and policies toward the former Soviet Union³. This study opened the direction toward an optimistic view of the mass public's capability of forming organized attitudes based on values.

In line with the positive view on the abilities of the mass public, Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) further the study by presenting an interactive model to explore how individuals make decisions about engaging in war with other countries. Their main findings suggest that the mass public actually adopts such values as isolationism (or internationalism) and cooperative (or militant) internationalism in support of war in various situations. Furthermore, citizens take into account situational factors (e.g., U.S. interests, the relative power of the potential adversary, the possession of nuclear weapons, the attacker's motivation, the political culture, and a respect for sovereignty) when they make decisions to go to war. Not only do individuals use both personal predispositions and situational conditions but also their consideration of situational factors varies according to individual's predispositions. For example, when U.S. interests are clearly at stake, assertive Americans are much more likely to support sending troops than accommodative Americans. On the other hand, if U.S. interests are minimal, few Americans of either type want to intervene. Similarly, when U.S. interests matter, even isolationists favor intervention. In cases in which,

2 Converse (1964) argues that the mass public fails to employ ideology in organizing its beliefs and attitudes. Due to this lack of a crowning principle, the public's attitudes are unorganized, unstable and inconsistent. In making this claim, Converse assumes that the elements of belief systems are organized only horizontally. But Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) posit a vertical hierarchy of the elements.

3 In the study, they propose that core values (e.g., ethnocentrism and moral beliefs about killing in warfare) are different from postures (e.g., militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism) since they pertain more to personal statements on the individual's priorities and concerns while postures relate more to government actions or policies (*ibid*, 1105-6). However, in later studies (Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; 1993) they focus more on the influence of postures in constraining foreign policy attitudes.

U.S. interests are involved, the difference between isolationists and internationalists grows and becomes significant. This study consolidates the results from previous studies (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Knopf 1998) which adopt optimistic views on the capacity of the public to make reasonable decisions in the area of international affairs.

Although these studies contributed to enhancing our understanding of how individuals make sense of international affairs, there is room for clarification regarding the reasons beliefs in foreign policy goals play an important role in guiding human decisions and preferences; whether multi-dimensional beliefs have a similar impact on the process; and how the relationships among them change relative to sophistication level.

Foreign Policy Beliefs and Goal Oriented Behaviors

The existing studies (e.g., Bardes and Oldendick 1978; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995; Holsti 1992; Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979; Richman, Malone, and Nolle 1997; Wittkopf 1986) show that the mass public can organize their foreign policy belief systems by relying on their beliefs in foreign policy goals. They propose different alternatives as to the number of dimensions of these goals by using the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR)'s surveys which began in 1974 and were conducted every four years until 2002⁴. They agree on the limited utility of a one dimensional understanding of foreign policy beliefs, as in the case of internationalism vs. isolationism. Thus, they propose a multidimensional approach as an alternative. For example, Wittkopf (1990) suggests employing two dimensions of beliefs in foreign policy, as he does with cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism. But Bardes and Oldendick (1978) proposes using three dimensions of foreign policy beliefs: in their case, militarism, internationalism, and Americanism. Similarly, Nincic (2008) suggests two dimensions of foreign policy beliefs: self-regarding beliefs and other-regarding beliefs. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) used three dimensions of beliefs: militarism, isolationism, and anticomunism. Chittick and others (1995) provided three factors: security, prosperity, and identity. More recently, Richman and others (1997) have proposed employing the following 4 dimensions by drawing on the surveys from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR)

⁴ The surveys after 2002 have been conducted every 2 years, and the organization changed its name to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2006. The survey data are available from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) or the Roper Center.

in 1990 and 1994: global altruism, global interest, U.S. domestic issues, and military security issues.

While these studies disagree on the number of factors or dimensions that structure foreign policy beliefs, they agree on the assumption that citizens can employ these goals and form their foreign policy opinions based on these beliefs. They share the proposition that individuals behave in a reasonable way and are able to link between goals and means. Thus, individuals' beliefs in goals will guide their choices of policies that are consistent with their beliefs in goals. Specifically, those individuals who are motivated by abstract principles and ideals (e.g., humanitarianism) are more likely to support policies that are consistent with their belief in altruistic idealism. Alternatively, those individuals who care more about their own interests and security are more likely to choose foreign policies that serve their self-interest. These expectations are consistent with the findings from other studies (e.g., Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Herrmann et al. 1999) which show that individuals are reasonable enough to engage in strategic and instrumental thinking and that this consideration shapes their foreign policy choices. For example, isolationism versus internationalism relates to the idea of whether or not it is good for United States interests to be actively involved in foreign affairs. Participation in foreign affairs is not the end state but a mode of conduct. Similarly, militant internationalism - which describes the belief that the best way to serve United States interests is to maintain and use military strength - can be categorized as an instrumental belief. This definition provides us with the proposition that human behaviors are guided by goals or principles and that they play an important role in directing human behaviors toward certain goals.

What kind of goals or principles will be influential in shaping American citizens' choice for foreign aid? I propose that both idealistic and realistic goals influence citizens' choices for foreign aid. Particularly, individuals' concern for humanitarianism and national interest will be a major source in accounting for their support for foreign aid. Humanitarianism has deep roots in American history and culture (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001). As a core universal principle it represents the liberalists' argument that moral principles should be the major guide line in deciding directions and means in American foreign policy. Such moral principles have frequently been invoked by political leaders (e.g., Carter and Clinton) to mobilize Americans to support their foreign policy, suggesting that humanitarianism influences citizens' foreign policy attitudes (e.g., Chandler 2002; Bellamy 2002; Roberts 1993). Without

seeking political or material gains, individuals sympathize with other peoples' or nations' suffering from inhumane conditions caused by disasters, political turmoil, oppression, or ill management of economic systems. Furthermore, they are willing to sacrifice their own welfare for those who are suffering from lack of food or human rights. Although this idealist belief is linked with other beliefs (e.g., cooperative internationalism and isolationism), it also represents an independent belief, in that humanitarianism is mainly focused on the moral principle to help the needy, not specifically on how to help them. As an ideal, humanitarianism itself is pertinent in explaining Americans' attitudes toward foreign policy.

In contrast to the altruistic humanitarian ideal, individuals' concern for Americans' own domestic interests will also be an important factor in accounting for their foreign policy choices. This may go against the realist theorists' argument (e.g., Morgenthau 1952; Kennan 1984; Mearsheimer 2001) that universalism or idealistic moral principles are more appealing to the mass public and that citizens are more willing to make their foreign policy opinions and decisions based on these principles. But scholars who emphasize the rationality of the public (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1992; Jentleson 1992; Popkin 1991) propose that citizens take into account their self interest when they express their policy preferences or cast their votes. As citizens worry about their own security and material prosperity, they are less likely to care about other nations' need or citizens' plight in other countries. Americans, like any other people in the world, care about their own economic wellbeing and social integrity first. Safeguarding national territory and resources is the most important goal that a nation state or members of each nation could achieve. In this sense, along with guaranteeing security, protecting domestic resources and the economic wealth of the U.S. is an important goal. Thus, I expect to find that concern for domestic interests should influence Americans' foreign policy attitudes. This definition of "domestic interests" is slightly different from the traditional concept of "national interests" in that it captures more of individuals' perceptions of their personal interests rather than a strategic and broader understanding of national interests. When individuals are concerned about protecting their own jobs, for instance, they are not motivated by communal concerns and interests but by pure self-centered interests. In that sense, Richman and other's (1997) definition of "domestic interests" is more relevant than the more general term "national interests".

In addition to these two major independent variables, the existing studies suggest that isolationism versus internationalism (e.g., Herrmann et al., 1999, and Hur-

witz and Peffley 1987), militarism (e.g., Richman et al., 1997, and Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), and cooperative internationalism play a significant role in accounting for citizens' foreign policy opinions. A basic principle in the area of foreign affairs is *isolationism*, which has been around since the beginning of the United States. It is a belief that America will be better off not engaging or getting involved in world politics. As Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) describes, it is a principle that guides decisions as to "the appropriate extent of involvement" in international affairs. Studies (Sniderman and Citrin 1971; Hurwitz and Peffley, Ibid; Herrmann et al. 1999) show that a belief in this principle influences the mass public's attitudes toward world affairs and choices. It is a very simple but fundamental standard that people can employ in making up their minds regarding world affairs. If individuals are committed to isolationism, they are less likely to support involvement in any type of activities (e.g., military, diplomatic, political, or economic) in world affairs. Thus, I expect that people who champion isolationism will be less likely to support giving economic aid.

As previous studies (e.g., Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Herrmann et al. 1999) have shown, *militarism* is an important belief that was closely related with national security and survival during the Cold War period. Certainly this goal, along with national economic interests, is at the core of realist theory (e.g., Morgenthau 1973; Osgood 1953). It is expected that a militant internationalist may not be enthusiastic about giving economic aid to other countries, since giving economic aid itself may not directly contribute to enhancing the military power and national security of the U.S. But the effect of militarism can be strong if a country is important for U.S. interests. In other words, the effect of militarism depends on the significance of the country to U.S. strategic interests.

In terms of the role of cooperative internationalism, it is plausible to expect that those individuals who believe that strengthening international organizations and working with them are important to U.S. interests are more likely to be supportive of foreign aid. According to the realists (e.g., Morgenthau 1973; Kennan 1984) those citizens who believe in the importance of international institutions and cooperation with other countries tend to be idealists. Thus, it is expected that those individuals who have a stronger belief in cooperative internationalism are supportive of giving foreign aid to other countries.

Another question that is addressed in this study is how citizens' use of these beliefs in goals differs by their level of sophistication. As Sniderman and others (1992) suggest, it is a mistake to treat the mass public as one homogeneous group which

would have same level of political sophistication throughout. In line with previous studies (Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Stimson 1975; Zaller 1992) that find that sophisticated individuals reason differently than less sophisticated individuals, it is expected that the sophisticated individuals organize their opinions more tightly and are able to use cognitive cues and heuristics more properly than less sophisticated ones. Based on these discussions I test six hypotheses.

First, individuals who believe in humanitarian ideals are more likely to support foreign aid. Second, individuals who believe in domestic interests are less likely to support foreign aid. Third, individuals who believe in isolationism are less likely to support foreign aid. Fourth, individuals who believe in militarism are more likely to support foreign aid to those countries that are strategically important to the U.S. Fifth, individuals who believe in cooperative internationalism are more likely to support foreign aid. Finally, there will be a difference in the effect of these beliefs on individuals' support for foreign aid according to sophistication level.

Individuals' support for foreign aid is chosen because this issue is relatively less frequently explored by researchers despite the fact that there have been debates about whether economic aid is useful or not, and about how to improve the effectiveness of aid⁵. Theoretically, foreign aid policy can be a valid policy to test the comparative effect of altruistic ideals and domestic self interests, which are the two main components of international politics theories: liberalism and realism.

Data and Measurements of the Variables

To examine the effect of citizens' beliefs in goals on their support for foreign aid, I use the surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization which were sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) in 1998 and 2010. Like previous surveys that were sponsored by the CCFR, the 1998 survey was conducted using face-to-face interviews, while the 2010 survey was conducted using the internet. The first survey includes 1507 men and women, aged 18 years of age and older, and the second survey involved 2597 respondents. All interviews were conducted between October 15 and November 10, 1998 and June 11-22, 2010, respectively. The 1998 survey was conducted in the time when the United States did not experience any major military threats in the world political scene after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1990 and before the dramatic experience of the September 11 attack in

⁵ There are exceptions to this lack of interest in foreign aid (e.g., Tingley 2010; Milner and Tingley 2013; Baker and Fitzgerald 2011).

2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The second survey of 2010 reflects the drastic experience of the September 11 attack and the aftermath of the Iraq war.

As measures of the public's support for foreign aid, I use a set of questions that relates to giving economic aid to specific countries. The questions regarding economic aid include each country by name or region (e.g., Egypt, Russia, Poland, Israel, African countries, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). Although the name of a country may evoke stronger information and impressions, this does not undermine our purpose of exploring what types of beliefs individuals use when they face relatively easier tasks. Instead, they will provide more textured information for judgment. For example, Russia and Israel will evoke different geo-political and cultural conditions when individuals are asked to make decisions on giving economic aid. Since the questions have 4 choices- increase, maintain the same level, decrease, and completely stop – I used ordered logit to estimate the model. I also created a general scale for the dependent variable to examine the support for foreign aid in general. For this scale, I used the Ordinary Least Square estimation method.

Beliefs in Goals

The major dimensions of beliefs that will be explored in this paper are humanitarianism, isolationism, militarism, cooperative internationalism, and domestic interests. Some of these beliefs in goals have already been studied in other studies (Hermann et al., 1999; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Peffley and Hurwitz 1993; Chittick et al. 1995; Richman et al. 1997; Wittkopf 1986) which explored the structure of belief systems and the impact of values on policy attitudes and choices.

For the measurement of *humanitarianism*, five items were used for the survey of 1998 and 3 items for the survey of 2010. The respondents were asked whether it is important for the American government to pursue certain policies. Among them five questions were used to measure humanitarianism: "protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression," "promoting and defending human rights in other countries," "combating world hunger," "helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations," and "helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations."⁶ The reliability coefficient of the items, Cronbach's alpha coefficient,

⁶ Including the item of "protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression" as a part of humanitarianism construction may be debatable. It could be considered as an item for "militarism." But the question taps into respondents' motivation to help a weaker nation rather than simply the act of using the military as a means to show the power of the U.S. or pursuing the military dominance. Other scholars (Richman et al., ibid) named this measure as "global altruism." Although the naming can be subjective, humanitarianism is closer reflec-

was .70 for the 1998 survey and .67 for the 2010 survey⁷. To construct the measure the items were linearly added. For example, in the 1998 survey, since each question has 3 choices (most important =3, somewhat important =2, not important at all =1), the added variable ranges from 1 to 15. I standardized the variable within the range of 0 and 1 by subtracting 1 and dividing it by 14 to compare the effect of the variables relatively easily⁸.

Cooperative internationalism captures individuals' belief as to whether or not it is desirable to strengthen international institutions and norms and to support actions to solve global problems through these institutions and norms. Four questions were asked of respondents regarding how important the following issues are as foreign policy goals: "strengthening the United Nations," "promoting market economies abroad," "improving the global environment," and "preventing the spread of nuclear weapon." The coefficient for Cronbach's alpha is .59 in 1998 and .58 in 2010.⁹ Four items in 1998 and three items in 2010 were added linearly to construct an index of cooperative internationalism

The questions that were used to construct *militarism* ask respondents whether three foreign policy goals are important to pursue: "combating international terrorism," "maintaining superior military power worldwide," and "defending our allies' security." The coefficient of alpha scale is .52 in 1998 and .58 in 2010¹⁰. Like previous measures, the items were added linearly.

Another goal is the development and maintenance of citizens' material well-being and security. It is noted as "*domestic interests*" to cover the span of goals that relate to protecting citizens' social and economic interests. This measurement is the same as that of Richman and others (1997). As realist theory explains, protecting and securing resources and jobs is another important element of national interests. The survival of a country depends not only on military power and strength but also on

tion of the questions because it contains both general (altruism) and specific characteristics (relieving basic human needs and rights for safety).

7 For the 2010 survey, there are only 3 questions available for the "humanitarianism" variable: "protecting weaker nation", "combating hunger", and "helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations". The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for this variable was .67. The Cronbach's alpha values for other belief measures are not high by the traditional rule of thumb criterion, .80. There may be some measurement errors involved in constructing the variable, which is the limitation of these surveys.

8 In this process, those individuals who do not answer all of these questions are treated as missing.

9 In 2010 survey, "promoting market economies abroad" was not asked.

10 The question "defending our allies' security" is not asked in 2010.

economic strength and social cohesiveness. Securing and sustaining the economic wealth and safety of its citizens are fundamental interests that a nation pursue, since without them military power or international prestige cannot be maintained. Thus, from the realist perspective, maintaining sound economic wealth and social system is a prerequisite for sustaining power.

A belief in this goal will significantly affect citizens' choices for economic aid to other countries, because they are motivated by the economic interests of the United States and concern for their own jobs. Six questions from the 1998 survey were used to construct a measure for "domestic interests": "reducing our trade deficit with foreign countries," "protecting the jobs of American workers," "securing adequate supplies of energy," "controlling and reducing illegal immigration," "stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States," and "protecting the interest of American business abroad." The reliability coefficient for the items is .62 in 1998 and .54 in 2010¹¹.

The question for the measure of *isolationism* is whether "it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs."

Other control variables are included: partisanship, ideology, income, age, and gender. Although Converse (1964) argued that the mass public fails to organize its attitudes and beliefs along liberal-conservative dimension, studies (Jacoby 1991; Murray 2002; Tingley 2010) show that ideology plays a role in shaping citizens' policy preferences, voting choices, and attitudes toward foreign aid. It ranges from extremely conservative (5) to extremely liberal (1)¹². Also studies on foreign policy suggest that individuals' partisan orientation influences their opinion on foreign policy (e.g., Shapiro and Bloch Elkon 2008). Partisanship is measured by using 3 categories (Republican, Independent, and Democrat). The gender gap has been studied in explaining the support for going to war (Eichenberg 2003; Sapiro and Conover 1993). It shows that men are far more likely than women to support sending troops to other parts of the world.

11 Only 3 questions are available in the 2010 survey: "protecting the jobs of American workers," "securing adequate supplies of energy," "controlling and reducing illegal immigration".

12 The range of ideology is different in the 2010 survey, which ranges from extremely conservative (7) to extremely liberal (1).

As for the first hypothesis, the impact of humanitarianism in explaining individuals' decisions to support giving economic aid to these countries is remarkably consistent and significant across the selected countries. All coefficients for humanitarianism are positive and statistically significant at a .01 level ($b= 2.16$ for Egypt, $b=2.08$ for Israel, $b=2.93$ for African countries, $b=2.24$ for Poland, and $b=1.62$ for Russia) in 1998.

Table 1: Support for Providing Foreign Aid (1998)

	Egypt	Israel	Africa	Poland	Russia	Aid total
Humanitarianism	2.16*** (0.39)	2.08*** (0.38)	2.93*** (0.39)	2.24*** (0.39)	1.62*** (0.37)	1.02*** (0.13)
Cooperative Int.	0.23 (0.39)	-0.41 (0.37)	0.92* (0.38)	0.57 (0.40)	1.08** (0.37)	0.23+ (0.13)
Domestic Interest	-2.33*** (0.46)	-1.17** (0.43)	-2.70*** (0.45)	-2.30*** (0.46)	-2.40*** (0.44)	-1.05*** (0.15)
Militarism	0.90* (0.41)	1.20** (0.40)	0.09 (0.40)	0.57 (0.41)	0.21 (0.39)	0.26+ (0.14)
Isolationism	-0.81*** (0.15)	-0.69*** (0.15)	-0.88*** (0.15)	-0.84*** (0.15)	-0.84*** (0.14)	-0.39*** (0.05)
Independents	-0.25 (0.17)	-0.50** (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)	-0.2 (0.18)	-0.26 (0.16)	-0.13* (0.06)
Democrats	-0.11 (0.18)	-0.34* (0.17)	0.01 (0.17)	-0.53** (0.18)	-0.47** (0.17)	-0.14* (0.06)
Ideology (high=Cons.)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.11 (0.07)	0.11+ (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)
Male	0.08 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.28* (0.13)	-0.2 (0.13)	0.17 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.04)
Education	0.1 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.17* (0.07)	0.13+ (0.07)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.07** (0.02)
Income	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.04+ (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0 (0.01)
Age	-0.03 (0.04)	0 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0 (0.01)
Cut One	-1.20* (0.55)	-0.83 (0.53)	-0.84 (0.54)	-0.02 (0.55)	0.44 (0.52)	2.06*** (0.19)
Cut Two	0.09 (0.55)	0.49 (0.53)	0.36 (0.54)	1.24* (0.56)	1.77*** (0.53)	
Cut Three	3.14*** (0.56)	2.97*** (0.54)	2.43*** (0.54)	3.90*** (0.57)	3.66*** (0.54)	
Log Likelihood	-1025.6	-1135.58	-1104.73	-1013.25	-1179.1	
Pseudo R ²	0.06	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.22
N	911	947	938	881	942	965

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1; two tailed; Ordered logit estimations
 OLS estimation for the last column

Similar results apply to the 2010 model. The first differences in Table 1a and 2a show the probability changes for humanitarianism. For example, in 1998 those who believe to a high degree in humanitarianism are 24% more likely to support “increasing” foreign aid to Egypt than those who do not believe in this idealistic value. In other words, citizens who care about helping poor nations, human rights, and democracy in other countries are far more likely to agree to give economic aid to these countries. In accord with liberalism, Americans are motivated by universal principles in making their decisions to lend economic help to Egypt, Israel, Africa, Poland, Russia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan regardless of different political circumstances. The strong impact of humanitarianism in helping citizens’ opinion formation shows that American citizens easily connect their belief in humanitarian goals and their choice for realizing these goals by providing economic aid to the target countries. While the influence of humanitarianism is significant and meaningful for every target country, the effect of this variable is strongest for the African countries (52% in 1998 and 44% in 2010). This suggests that citizens are more likely motivated by humanitarianism when they want to increase economic aid to African countries more than to other nations.

Table 2: Sources of Support for Foreign Aid (2010)

	Egypt	Israel	Africa	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Aid total
Humanitarianism	0.89** (0.32)	1.41*** (0.31)	2.02*** (0.32)	1.55*** (0.31)	1.34*** (0.31)	0.65*** (0.10)
Cooperative Int.	0.46 (0.32)	-1.13*** (0.31)	0.03 (0.31)	0.15 (0.30)	0.21 (0.31)	-0.02 (0.10)
Domestic Interest	-0.28 (0.36)	0.47 (0.35)	-0.82* (0.36)	-0.57 (0.35)	-0.50 (0.35)	-0.19 (0.12)
Militarism	0.34 (0.31)	0.49+ (0.30)	-0.56+ (0.31)	-0.3 (0.30)	0.01 (0.30)	0.01 (0.10)
Isolationism	-0.51*** (0.14)	-0.41** (0.14)	-0.69*** (0.14)	-0.71*** (0.14)	-0.55*** (0.14)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Independents	0.16 (0.15)	-0.12 (0.15)	0.23 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	0.17 (0.15)	0.04 (0.05)
Democrats	0.17 (0.18)	0.08 (0.17)	0.37* (0.17)	0.12 (0.17)	0.15 (0.17)	0.07 (0.06)
Ideology (high=Cons.)	-0.12* (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.05** (0.02)
Male	0.22+ (0.12)	0.04 (0.11)	0.16 (0.12)	0.35** (0.11)	0.24* (0.11)	0.10* (0.04)
Education	0.07 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.13* (0.05)	0.17** (0.05)	0.06** (0.02)
Income	0 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0 (0.00)
Age	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06+ (0.04)	-0.07+ (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03* (0.01)
Cut One	-0.67 (0.47)	-0.59 (0.47)	-2.00*** (0.48)	-0.34 (0.46)	-0.15 (0.46)	
Cut Two	1.79*** (0.48)	1.71*** (0.47)	0.5 (0.47)	1.63*** (0.46)	1.87*** (0.47)	
Cut Three	3.88*** (0.49)	2.95*** (0.48)	1.28** (0.47)	3.15*** (0.47)	3.84*** (0.48)	
constant						1.98*** (0.16)
N	1115	1118	1122	1116	1117	
Log Likelihood	-1233.07	-1364.96	-1308.08	-1365.18	-1319.73	
Pseudo R ²	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.13

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1; two tailed; Ordered logit estimations

OLS estimation for the last column

As to the second hypothesis on the effect of domestic interests, the expectation is confirmed in the 1998 model but not in 2010. American citizens who care more about their jobs, domestic security, and natural resources are far less likely to be supportive of increasing foreign aid to the target countries. The coefficients of national economic interest are all negative and statistically significant at the .01 level in 1998 (Table 1). Specifically, those who care about domestic interests are 8% less likely than those who have a lower level of concern for domestic interests to support "increasing" foreign aid to African countries (Table 1a). Similarly, they show negative attitudes toward other countries in 1998. But this variable fails to show any significant effect on foreign aid in 2010. All the coefficients except in the case of Africa fail to reach traditional statistical significance. Those who have a higher level of concern for domestic interests are 11% less likely than those who have a lower level of concern to support increasing foreign aid to Africa in 2010 (Table 2a). The results show that the effect of domestic interests is time bound.

Table 1a: First differences: Sources of Foreign Aid (1998)

	Egypt	Israel	Africa	Poland	Russia	Aid total
Humanitarianism (low → high)	0.24 (0.1)	0.25 (0.1)	0.52 (0.11)	0.15 (0.08)	0.1 (0.06)	1.02 (0.13)
Cooperative Int.(low → high)	0.01 (0.24)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.11 (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)	0.23 (0.13)
Domestic Interest (low → high)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-1.06 (0.15)
Militarism (low → high)	0.06 (0.05)	0.11 (0.07)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.26 (0.14)
Isolationism (low → high)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.1 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.39 (0.05)

Predicted probabilities are based on the ordered logit estimations in Table 1. They are for "increasing" foreign aid choice only. Other values for the dependent variable (i.e., "maintain the same level", "decrease", or "completely stop") are not shown here. The probabilities are obtained by using CLARIFY (Tomz et al., 2003). The bold faced values are the ones whose 90% confidence intervals for the mean probabilities (or expected values).

Table 2a: First differences: Sources of Foreign Aid (2010)

	Egypt	Israel	Africa	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Aid total
Humanitarianism (low → high)	0.03 (0.2)	0.13 (0.06)	0.44 (0.07)	0.14 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)	0.65 (0.1)
Cooperative Int.(low → high)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.02)	0 (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.1)
Domestic Interest (low → high)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.11 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.19 (0.12)
Militarism (low → high)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.08 (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.1)
Isolationism (low → high)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.14 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.23 (0.04)

Predicted probabilities are based on the ordered logit estimations in Table 1. They are for “increasing” foreign aid choice only. Other values for the dependent variable (i.e., “maintain the same level”, “decrease”, or “completely stop”) are not shown here. The probabilities are obtained by using CLARIFY (Tomz et al., 2003). The bold faced values are the ones whose 90% confidence intervals for the mean probabilities (or expected values).

In line with previous findings (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Herrmann et al. 1999) that show its prominent influence, isolationism consistently explains the mass public’s support for economic aid in both models (Table 1 and 2). Those who adopt an isolationistic perspective are significantly less likely to give economic aid to developing countries (Egypt and African countries), the U.S.’s traditional allies (Israel), countries from the former Soviet Union (Russia and Poland) or countries that are associated with terrorism (Afghanistan and Pakistan). This shows that, as a basic but fundamental belief that has deep roots in American history, isolationism – in contrast with internationalism – provides citizens with a simple but powerful guideline in foreign affairs. Since the estimation results in Table 1 and 2 are ordered logit coefficients, it is difficult to interpret them intuitively. I use the first differences to examine the effect of these variables in probabilities¹³. The results in Table 1a show that those who believe in isolationism are 5% less likely to support increasing foreign aid to Egypt. Similarly, they are 5%, 10%, 3%, and 4% less likely to support increasing foreign aid to Israel, African countries, Poland, and Russia, respectively. Table 2a shows the results of the 2010 survey. The results are similar to those of 1998, except that the effect of isolationism on aid to African countries is substantially increased to 14%. The fourth hypothesis states that the effect of militarism will depend on whether

¹³The first differences are obtained by setting other independent variables at their mean or mode and changing the level of the interested independent variables. For the example of isolationism, I change it from 0 to 1 to estimate how the probabilities change for the choice of “increasing” foreign aid. Due to the limit of space I present only the choice of “increasing” foreign aid and omit other choices (“stopping aid”, “decreasing aid”, and “maintaining aid”). For the first differences I use CLARIFY (Tomz and others, 2003).

the country is strategically important to the U.S. or not. The estimation results show that this is the case. As Americans perceive Egypt and Israel to be important allies in the Middle East in 1998, those who believe in militarism are more likely (6% and 11%, respectively) to support increasing foreign aid (Table 1a). This tendency remains the same for Israel (3%) in 2010 (Table 2a), but weakened.

Although cooperative internationalism does not have a consistent impact on individuals' support for giving economic aid, it has a positive and significant influence on their choices in the case of , Russia ($b=1.08$), and Africa ($b=.92$) in 1998 (Table 1). Those who champion the ideas of strengthening international organizations, especially the UN, and of concern for world-wide tasks, are more likely to support giving economic aid to those two countries in 1998. But the effect of cooperative internationalism is significant only in the case of Israel in 2010. Then, those who believe in cooperative internationalism are 4% less likely to be supportive of increasing foreign aid to Israel (Table 2a). This change may be a reflection of the effects of the Iraq war and other turmoil in the Middle East.

I test the final hypothesis by using education as a proxy for sophistication¹⁴. This will allow us to examine how sophistication level influences the way individuals use goals differently. Among the respondents, those who only finished high school were treated as having a low sophistication level. Those who have some college education, college and post-graduate education were marked as having a high sophistication level.

The results weakly support the hypothesis on the differential effects of beliefs by sophistication level. The number of significant coefficients in the individual models in 1998 (Table 3a and 3b) show that there are more (19 out of 25) significant ones among those with a high sophistication level than those with a low sophistication level (16 out of 25). Similarly, the number of significant coefficients in the 2010 model (Table 4a and 4b) shows that there are more at the high level (13 out of 25) than at the low level (11 out of 25).

¹⁴ Studies (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Luskin 1987; Zaller 1992) have shown that there is a better measure for political sophistication: a political knowledge index which is created by using multiple items. In this survey it is impossible to use those types of measures since there are no such items available. Although it is not completely satisfactory, we use education as a proxy measure of sophistication.

Table 3a: Support for Providing Foreign Aid by low sophistication level (1998)

	Egypt	Israel	Africa	Poland	Russia	Aid total
Humanitarianism	2.18*** (0.61)	3.38*** (0.62)	2.62*** (0.60)	1.20+ (0.62)	1.17* (0.59)	0.95*** (0.16)
Cooperative Int.	0.68 (0.62)	-0.99 (0.62)	0.43 (0.61)	1.20+ (0.64)	1.23* (0.60)	0.19 (0.16)
Domestic Interest	-2.38** (0.78)	-1.11 (0.76)	-1.83* (0.76)	-2.27** (0.82)	-1.78* (0.76)	-0.97*** (0.17)
Militarism	0.81 (0.67)	0.14 (0.67)	-0.34 (0.65)	1.06 (0.69)	0.18 (0.66)	0.40* (0.16)
Isolationism	0.44* (0.21)	0.44* (0.21)	0.96*** (0.21)	0.82*** (0.22)	0.67** (0.20)	0.47*** (0.06)
Independents	-0.3 (0.28)	-0.79** (0.28)	0.04 (0.27)	-0.49+ (0.29)	-0.32 (0.27)	-0.09 (0.07)
Democrats	-0.18 (0.26)	-0.62* (0.26)	-0.27 (0.25)	-0.76** (0.27)	-0.40 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.08)
Ideology(high=Cons.)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)	0.03 (0.10)	0.01 (0.09)	0.04 (0.03)
Male	-0.09 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.19)	-0.46* (0.19)	-0.38+ (0.20)	0.07 (0.19)	-0.01 (0.05)
Income	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.05+ (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03* (0.01)
Age	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)	0 (0.00)
Cut One	-2.32** (0.73)	-2.20** (0.71)	-2.44*** (0.71)	-1.28+ (0.74)	-0.87 (0.69)	1.63*** (0.25)
Cut Two	-1.02 (0.72)	-0.93 (0.70)	-1.25+ (0.70)	0.03 (0.74)	0.61 (0.69)	557
Cut Three	1.64* (0.73)	1.50* (0.71)	0.65 (0.70)	2.70*** (0.76)	2.51*** (0.70)	
N	382	396	397	367	395	
Log Likelihood	-451.35	-478.23	-486.1	-430.63	-507.65	
Pseudo R ²	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.03	0.28

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1; two tailed; Ordered logit estimations

OLS estimation for the last column

Table 3b: Support for Providing Foreign Aid by high sophistication level (1998)

	Egypt	Israel	Africa	Poland	Russia	Aid total
Humanitarianism	1.94*** (0.51)	1.12* (0.49)	2.91*** (0.51)	2.84*** (0.52)	1.79*** (0.49)	1.02*** (0.22)
Cooperative Int.	-0.09 (0.51)	-0.03 (0.48)	1.24* (0.50)	0.11 (0.52)	0.95* (0.48)	0.29 (0.24)
Domestic Interest	-2.24*** (0.59)	-1.03+ (0.54)	-2.99*** (0.59)	-2.09*** (0.57)	-2.43*** (0.57)	-0.98*** (0.29)
Militarism	1.13* (0.52)	1.97*** (0.50)	0.53 (0.51)	0.36 (0.52)	0.27 (0.50)	0.11 (0.25)
Isolationism	1.18*** (0.21)	0.98*** (0.20)	0.92*** (0.21)	0.92*** (0.21)	1.06*** (0.20)	0.33*** (0.08)
Independents	-0.28 (0.22)	-0.31 (0.21)	0.04 (0.21)	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.26 (0.21)	-0.19+ (0.10)
Democrats	-0.04 (0.25)	-0.03 (0.23)	0.25 (0.24)	-0.44+ (0.24)	-0.58* (0.23)	-0.20* (0.10)
Ideology(high=Cons.)	0.15 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.14 (0.09)	0.18+ (0.10)	0.23* (0.09)	-0.01 (0.03)
Male	0.21 (0.18)	-0.21 (0.17)	-0.15 (0.17)	-0.1 (0.17)	0.20 (0.16)	-0.08 (0.07)
Income	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.07+ (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.01)
Age	0.06 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.11+ (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	0 (0.00)
Cut One	-0.05 (0.83)	0.56 (0.79)	0.15 (0.82)	0.57 (0.83)	0.74 (0.81)	2.71*** (0.27)
Cut Two	1.27 (0.84)	1.96* (0.79)	1.37+ (0.82)	1.80* (0.83)	1.93* (0.81)	
Cut Three	4.71*** (0.86)	4.56*** (0.81)	3.61*** (0.84)	4.51*** (0.86)	3.85*** (0.82)	
N	529	551	541	514	547	408
Log Likelihood	-560.63	-643.73	-609.83	-575.28	-662.78	
Pseudo R ²	0.08	0.06	0.1	0.08	0.08	0.17

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1; two tailed; Ordered logit estimations

OLS estimation for the last column

This implies that those citizens who have higher education are more capable of using different beliefs in an effective way than those who have less. It also means that the more sophisticated individuals can connect their goal orientations with proper means tightly. Sniderman and others (*ibid*) found similarly that sophisticated individuals are better able than less sophisticated ones to use information and cognitive heuristics including affective 'likeability' heuristics in forming their decisions. But this differential effect by sophistication level is not as strong as I expected.

Table 4a: Support for Providing Foreign Aid by low sophistication level (2010)

	Egypt	Israel	Africa	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Aid total
Humanitarianism	0.62 (0.52)	1.47** (0.50)	1.57** (0.51)	1.12* (0.49)	1.33** (0.50)	0.55** (0.17)
Cooperative Int.	0.48 (0.54)	-1.03+ (0.53)	0.03 (0.52)	-0.22 (0.51)	-0.19 (0.51)	-0.06 (0.18)
Domestic Interest	-0.54 (0.60)	0.25 (0.60)	-1.43* (0.60)	-0.62 (0.60)	-0.96 (0.60)	-0.3 (0.21)
Militarism	0.14 (0.53)	0.18 (0.52)	-0.08 (0.53)	0.3 (0.52)	0.09 (0.52)	0.01 (0.18)
Isolationism	-0.78*** (0.21)	-0.73*** (0.21)	-0.97*** (0.21)	-0.89*** (0.21)	-0.71*** (0.21)	-0.31*** (0.07)
Independents	-0.07 (0.26)	-0.53* (0.25)	0.14 (0.25)	-0.19 (0.25)	-0.14 (0.25)	-0.08 (0.09)
Democrats	0.08 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.27)	0.46+ (0.27)	0.19 (0.27)	0.06 (0.27)	0.05 (0.09)
Ideology(high=Cons.)	-0.37*** (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.27*** (0.08)	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.19* (0.08)	-0.08** (0.03)
Male	0.06 (0.19)	0.1 (0.19)	-0.24 (0.19)	0.09 (0.19)	0.12 (0.19)	0.02 (0.07)
Income	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.02)
Cut One	-2.10** (0.71)	-1.19+ (0.70)	-2.77*** (0.71)	-1.04 (0.69)	-1.41* (0.69)	
Cut Two	0.44 (0.70)	1.27+ (0.70)	-0.25 (0.70)	0.83 (0.68)	0.66 (0.69)	
Cut Three	2.25** (0.72)	2.26** (0.71)	0.47 (0.70)	2.60*** (0.70)	2.59*** (0.71)	
constant						2.38*** (0.24)
N	418	418	422	421	420	422
Log Likelihood	-450.27	-495.06	-481.07	-498.75	-479.19	
Pseudo R ²	0.06	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.15

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1; two tailed; Ordered logit estimations
 OLS estimation for the last column

Table 4b: Support for Providing Foreign Aid by high sophistication level (2010)

	Egypt	Israel	Africa	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Aid total
Humanitarianism	1.20** (0.41)	1.49*** (0.40)	2.30*** (0.41)	1.88*** (0.40)	1.43*** (0.40)	0.74*** (0.13)
Cooperative Int.	0.70+ (0.40)	-1.18** (0.39)	0.01 (0.39)	0.35 (0.39)	0.50 (0.39)	0.02 (0.13)
Domestic Interest	-0.23 (0.46)	0.52 (0.44)	-0.5 (0.45)	-0.6 (0.44)	-0.29 (0.44)	-0.13 (0.14)
Militarism	0.17 (0.39)	0.62+ (0.37)	-0.94* (0.38)	-0.68+ (0.37)	-0.15 (0.38)	-0.06 (0.12)
Isolationism	-0.3 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.18)	-0.55** (0.19)	-0.58** (0.19)	-0.46* (0.18)	-0.17** (0.06)
Independents	0.37+ (0.20)	0.13 (0.19)	0.33+ (0.19)	0.34+ (0.19)	0.37+ (0.19)	0.13* (0.06)
Democrats	0.34 (0.24)	0.18 (0.23)	0.33 (0.23)	0.12 (0.23)	0.25 (0.23)	0.1 (0.08)
Ideology(high=Cons.)	0.04 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.22** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.02)
Male	0.35* (0.15)	0.02 (0.14)	0.43** (0.15)	0.52*** (0.14)	0.33* (0.14)	0.15** (0.05)
Income	0.01 (0.02)	0 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Age	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.08+ (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04** (0.02)
Cut One	-0.05 (0.62)	-0.71 (0.61)	-2.60*** (0.62)	-0.48 (0.60)	-0.11 (0.60)	
Cut Two	2.45*** (0.63)	1.55* (0.61)	-0.04 (0.61)	1.59** (0.60)	1.90** (0.60)	
Cut Three	4.74*** (0.65)	2.94*** (0.62)	0.78 (0.61)	3.03*** (0.61)	3.91*** (0.62)	
constant						2.00*** (0.20)
N	697	700	700	695	697	701
Log Likelihood	-763.51	-858.18	-814.05	-855.42	-833.40	
Pseudo R ²	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.13

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1; two tailed; Ordered logit estimations

OLS estimation for the last column

Conclusions

How do Americans make sense of foreign affairs despite their lack of knowledge of and interest in issues and the complexity of international politics? Studies have shown that individuals overcome their cognitive limitations by adopting a variety of heuristics and cues. Prominent heuristic aids are goals or principles that help citizens organize attitudes and opinions on foreign affairs. Although we know that American citizens can organize their foreign policy attitudes by relying on beliefs in goals, few studies examine the effect of these beliefs on their policy preferences. I have sought to expand the previous studies by extending them to goals that may contribute to accounting for citizens' foreign policy attitudes. Prominent beliefs in goals that have been ignored in the past are the pursuit of humanitarianism, cooperative internationalism, and national economic interests. Among these beliefs, the altruistic, idealistic belief, humanitarianism, is the most prominent and consistent belief that influences individuals' support for foreign aid regardless of time. Furthermore, the results show that Americans employ not only traditionally known foreign policy goals (e.g., isolationism and militarism) but also other goals to organize and form their foreign policy attitudes and opinions. The implication of this finding is clear. Individuals do employ a variety of beliefs in goals in organizing their foreign policy attitudes. Also, the functional relations of goals and attitudes depend on specific types of tasks that citizens face. Beliefs in goals guide citizens with relevant judgment tasks. Thus, goals affect citizens' behavior in the domain which is relevant to the goals. This study shows that we need to expand our search for relevant dimensions of beliefs beyond the conventional beliefs in foreign policy (e.g., isolationism vs. internationalism).

In addition, this study demonstrates that major international theories have their own merits in explaining citizens' foreign policy attitudes. Consistent with idealists' claims, Americans cherish humanitarianism, which has deep roots in American history and tradition. Those who champion humanitarian ideals are far more likely to support giving economic aid to needy countries and allies. Although these passion-driven attitudes may concern realists, universal ideals and principles are a driving force for American citizens in foreign affairs. The limited impact of cooperative internationalism shows that the public rarely adopts this belief in forming their opinions on foreign aid, and this goes against liberalists' arguments that international organizations and laws would play a significant role in world politics. While citizens' adherence to abstract ideals sounds alarming to realists, there is strong evidence that Americans do make decisions based on their evaluation of U.S. inter-

ests. Regardless of evaluation objects, citizens' concerns for their own self-interest determine their decisions to give economic aid. As the major theories do capture a part of the reality of international politics, they provide approximate guidelines to understanding how an individual would comprehend world affairs. But this prominence of domestic interests is observed in 1998 only. After the experience of the September 11 attacks and the Iraq war, citizens' concerns for domestic interests do not have much influence on their opinions on foreign aid. This shows that political contexts could significantly affect the influence of beliefs on goals.

The influence of political context is observed in the effect of ideology on public support for foreign aid. Before the September 11 attacks and the Iraq war, ideology does not have much influence in accounting for their foreign aid support, but it shows significant influence in 2010, which is more evidence for the influence of a polarized political context. As other studies (e.g., Nincic 2004; Tingley 2010) suggest, domestic politics definitely affect foreign policy more now than in the past.

Another important finding is that the different segments of the mass public use beliefs in goals and strategic calculations in different ways, although the magnitude of difference is weaker than I expected. In accord with other studies (e.g., Zaller 1992; Sniderman et al. 1991), knowledgeable Americans tend to be able to organize their attitudes tightly and employ values and strategic reasoning in a better way than those without such knowledge. What this tells us is that although Americans can organize their attitudes and form opinions in foreign affairs by using beliefs in goals and engaging in strategic thinking, the versatility in using these elements of reasoning depends on cognitive ability. Although Converse's (1964) original concern for the gap between sophisticated individuals and less sophisticated ones is overstated, the gap still exists.

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Appendix

Dependent Variables

Economic assistance to other countries

Economic aid to each country: In particular, do you think economic aid to the following people or nations should be increased, decreased, kept about the same, or stopped altogether? (N=1507 in 1998, N=1273 in 2010)

Egypt (Increased=4: Decreased=3: Kept the same=2: Stopped altogether=1)

Israel, African countries, Poland (1998 only), Russia (1998 only), Afghanistan (2010 only), and Pakistan (2010 only)

Independent variables

Beliefs

Isolationism:

Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? (Active participation=1 Stay out =0).

I am going to read a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please say whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all.

Humanitarianism:

Protecting weaker national against foreign aggression (Very important=3; Somewhat important=2; Not important=1)

Promoting and defending human rights in other countries (1998 only)

Combating world hunger

Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations

Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations (1998 only)

Cooperative Internationalism:

Strengthening the United Nations (Very important =3; Somewhat important =2;
Not important=1)

Promoting market economies abroad (1998 only)

Improving the global environment

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapon

Domestic Interest:

Reducing our trade deficit with foreign countries (Very important=3;Somewhat
important=2; Not important=1; 1998 only)

Protecting the jobs of American workers

Securing adequate supplies of energy

Controlling and reducing illegal immigration

Stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States (1998 only)

Militarism

Combating international terrorism (Very important=3; Somewhat important=2:
Not important=1)

Maintaining superior military power worldwide

Defending our allies' security (1998 only)

Political Ideology

How would you describe your political views: as very conservative, fairly con-
servative, middle of the road, fairly liberal or very liberal ?

(very conservative =5: fairly conservative=4 : middle of the road =3 : fairly lib-
eral =2: very liberal =1) - 1998 survey

(extremely conservative=7; conservative=6, slightly conservative=5, middle of
the road=4, slightly liberal=3, liberal=2, extremely liberal =1) – 2010 survey

Partisanship

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Demo-
crat, an independent, or what? (Republican =1, Independent=2, Democrat =3)

Gender: (male =1: female=0)

Education

What was the last grade or class you completed in school? (none or grade 1-4 : grade 5-7 : grade 8 : High school incomplete, grade 9 -11 : High school graduate, grade 12 : Technical, trade, or business : College, University incomplete : college, university, graduate)

Age: (mean= 46.83, min=18, max=91)

Family Income: (mean=11.24, min=1, max=15)

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