In a 2012 paper, “Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” researchers James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh introduce a graphical framework to illustrate the potential “zone of possible agreement” between Iran and the United States. Rather than concentrating on tactics and strategy, the negotiation analysis centers on the design of the potential deals and the “setup” under which the negotiation takes place. Their analytical model “relates input assumptions about the parties’ interests, their no-deal options, and possible deals” to graphically illustrate a range of potential outcomes.

One of the most revealing aspects of the authors’ analytical framework is its suggestion that, under the current state of affairs, no zone of possible agreement exists. At present, the most the United States is willing to concede is at odds with the minimum amount of nuclear capacity that Iran is willing to accept. The United States insists that Iran must, at a minimum, stop its uranium enrichment program. Recognizing this gulf, the authors argue, “The failure by multiple parties via a variety of negotiation processes to make serious progress suggests…the absence of an underlying zone of possible agreement.”

Given that no zone of possible agreement currently exists, the authors suggest that the US place less emphasis on offering a wide range of potential deals to Iran and prioritize influencing “the setup” under which these deals would occur. In other words, the authors recommend the adoption of a multi-faceted strategy that imposes costs, designs incentives, and redraws red lines on the Iranian regime to create a zone of possible agreement.

Sebenisu and Singh argue that previous diplomatic strategies toward Iran have failed for a variety of reasons: the United States downplayed the threat of military force, imposed economic sanctions on non-critical Iranian markets, and applied sanctions only sporadically. Using their analytical framework, the authors argue that a successful costs-incentives strategy should meet the following three criteria: the strategy must be credible, it must have a meaningful impact on important Iranian markets, and “it must be of sufficient magnitude relative to the value Iran places on its nuclear program.”

Sebenius and Singh’s analysis reminds readers that diplomatic strategies should not only concentrate on crafting deals, but also on changing the status quo. Despite the reemerging possibility of nuclear negotiations between the United States and Iran, it may nonetheless be time for the United States to refocus its strategy.

Feature Photo: cc/Taniwha

While public education systems in the developing world often suffer from numerous structural and financial challenges, the low level of education among parents may also be a significant impediment to children’s educational success. In a new paper, “The Impact of Mother Literacy and Participation Programs on Child Learning: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in India,” Rukmini Banerji, James Berry, and Marc Shotland examine whether interventions targeting mothers’ literacy improve their children’s education outcomes. They find that mothers’ literacy programs boost children’s math scores, increase mothers’ participation in their children’s learning, and bolster women’s sense of empowerment.

The authors partnered with Pratham, a non-governmental organization in India, to conduct a randomized control trial evaluating the impact of mothers’ literacy programs on their children’s education in Bihar and Rajasthan, two Indian states with low levels of literacy among women. The organization randomly selected over 8,500 mothers from 480 villages to participate in the trial. Based on their random assignment into one of four groups, Pratham offered participating women either: (1) adult literacy classes, (2) training materials on how to enhance their children’s learning, or (3) a combination of both interventions. Women in a fourth group did not receive any intervention and served as a control group.

To measure the impact of Pratham’s programs, the authors first collected baseline data from the selected mothers and their children through household surveys and standardized tests. After one year, they collected post-intervention data using the same instruments, as well as additional metrics to evaluate women’s empowerment.

Banerji, Berry, and Shotland find that all three treatments improved children’s math scores in comparison to the control group. However, only the combined intervention increased children’s reading scores. Mothers in each of the treatment groups also reported increased involvement in their children’s education, including talking to their child about their studies and reviewing their homework assignments. Additionally, women in each treatment groups had higher math and reading scores after a year of program participation. Notably, all three treatments also had a positive effect on women’s sense of empowerment, which the authors measured through metrics such as their involvement in household decision-making and their beliefs about the value of their own education.

The authors note, however, that the treatments had no effect on children’s educational behaviors, such as regular attendance and enrollment rates. They also admit that since it is likely that young children accompanied their mothers to literacy classes, they cannot rule out the possibility that the treatment effect is, in fact, due to their exposure to the program itself, rather than result of their mothers’ education. Moreover, since the authors collected post-intervention data one year after the program’s inception, their findings do not indicate whether the positive effects are sustainable over time.

Given the need for mechanisms that improve the quality of education in the developing world, Banerji, Berry, and Shotland’s evaluation is both relevant and timely. Mothers’ literacy and education programs could supplement ongoing education initiatives for children—Pratham’s Mothers’ Literacy program, for example, relies almost entirely on materials designed to increase children’s literacy. The authors state that their analysis “shows that literacy and participation programs can impact both mother and child learning.” They conclude, “This is encouraging evidence for policymakers looking to improve adult and child learning, as well as the education environment in the home.”

As policymakers and development actors move closer to achieving their goal of universal primary education, they should begin to look toward improving the quality of this education. Investing in mothers’ human capital could be a valuable tool to meet this new challenge.

Feature Photo: cc/Pratham Books

Kei Koizumi, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Kei Koizumi is the Assistant Director for Federal Research and Development at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Prior to joining OSTP, Koizumi was on the Obama transition team’s Technology, Innovation & Government Reform Policy Working Group, before which he was the longtime Director of the R&D Budget and Policy Program at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). He received his Masters in International Science and Technology Policy from George Washington University and his Bachelors in Comparative Political Economy from Boston University.

The US R&D system is decentralized relative to many other countries, with many different agencies funding R&D. Within that context, how do you coordinate priorities for R&D funding? What are the highest priority funding areas for science and technology?

You’re right that the United States has a highly decentralized R&D funding system. We don’t have a Department of Science, instead we have two dozen departments and agencies supporting R&D because they need science and technology to carry out their missions.

But there are several science and technology areas that cut across agency missions and have broad benefits for meeting the nation’s challenges. We want to be sure that, as a nation, we support the funding areas that have great promise for meeting multiple agencies’ needs. These priority areas do change from year to year, because of changing scientific and technical opportunities, changing economic conditions, and changing national political priorities.

To identify these priority areas, my office (OSTP) collaborates with the Office of Management and Budget annually on an interagency R&D priorities memo that identifies key interagency science and technology (S&T) priorities for the coming year.

The latest memo, released June 2012, is available on the White House web site and identifies the following highest priority funding areas: advanced manufacturing; clean energy; global climate change; R&D for informed policymaking and management; information technology R&D; nanotechnology; biological innovation; STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education; and innovation and commercialization. The memo explains in more detail what the opportunities are in each of these areas.

OSTP has minimal budget power relative to similar agencies in other countries. What mechanisms does the OSTP have to promote the President’s R&D agenda?

It’s true that OSTP has minimal budget power. OSTP itself doesn’t fund research, we’re a policy office with a small budget of less than $5 million. But we do advise the President, senior White House officials, and other White House offices (including the Office of Management and Budget) on how the Federal R&D funding agencies might best promote the President’s R&D agenda, and we try to formulate and implement R&D funding policies across the Federal government.

OSTP also has the convening power to bring the Federal agencies together to implement the R&D agenda. We rely heavily on informal conversations inside the Federal government, but we also rely on policy documents such as the R&D priorities memo, interagency reports on science and technology, engagement with the US science and engineering community and the broader public to build support for R&D funding policies, and expert advice from the science and engineering community.

What countries have good models for funding science and technology? How much does the OSTP look at how other countries allocate R&D funding?

OSTP does look at how other countries allocate R&D funding for lessons, but we find that in most cases the unique character of the US system means we have to craft our own models. That said, time and time again we find that the US has been and continues to be the model for other nations in S&T funding.

The US S&T funding system is built on competitively-awarded research grants distributed to investigators with the best ideas identified through peer review, and this system has helped to build US leadership in science. That competitive model is a US invention that is now being copied around the world, from the European Union to Japan to China. The US funding system is also diverse enough and flexible enough to take in Federal labs, industry labs, universities, national labs (contractor-operated labs), and nonprofits with many links between them, including steady flows of talented people.

The result is a system in which bright ideas make the transition from the laboratory to the marketplace more smoothly and quickly than other nations; other nations are trying to learn from US technology transfer policies and other policies that make this system possible.

I’ll also add that US universities are the world-leading institutions for combining research, education, and economic development because of US S&T funding policies encouraging a tight linkage between research and education; other nations are trying to learn from these policies. But we are always trying to learn, too! For example, you may have noticed that in his recent State of the Union address the President commended Germany for its education system, which does an excellent job of preparing high-school graduates for technical careers. So the Federal government is working with high schools, community colleges, and companies to figure out what the right Federal policies are for US high school students to have similar skills when they graduate.

Amid federal budget cuts, how do you determine what areas of S&T research get funded and which get cut? How can you be sure funding is being spent effectively?  

These are always very difficult decisions. When resources are scarce, as they are now and are likely to be in the future, we try to rely first on the science and technology community’s judgments about the most important research areas.

The Federal government periodically asks the science community, through the National Academy of Sciences, to tell policymakers what the most important scientific opportunities are in a field and to rank science projects by importance. These reports, which we call decadal surveys, are important guides for policymakers because they give us the science community’s best judgment as to which areas or projects to cut first and which investments to protect when budgets are tight. There are many other similar prioritization exercises undertaken by the community through scientific advisory boards, the National Science Board, and other groups of scientists and engineers.

Once research projects are underway, we rely on many mechanisms for tracking progress. Federal agencies and their Inspectors General keep an eye on spending efficiency, to make sure that Federal research funds are being spent appropriately and efficiently. But there are many other ways in which we try to ensure that Federal research projects are making progress toward science and policy outcomes.

Just to give a few examples, OSTP asks the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), a group of Presidentially-appointed scientists and engineers, to review periodically our nanotechnology and our IT research programs to make sure that they continue to answer the right scientific questions and that they make progress toward solving problems. Federal agencies have put in place scientific advisory boards for their programs; they meet periodically to look at research portfolios to judge how well they are meeting scientific and policy goals, and they often recommend changes in research funding and policies to improve their performance.

We, PCAST, and advisory boards rely on data that Federal agencies collect about their research programs, everything from scientists supported to papers published to new inventions and companies created. And we look at the scientific literature within a field and studies about a field to ensure that the US research effort is world-leading and productive. If the US effort is not what it could be then we can work with Federal agencies to try to improve performance through follow-up policies.

Feature Photo: cc/estherase

In the October 2012 working paper “Skilled Immigration and the Employment Structures and Innovation Rates of US Firms”, Sari Pekkala Kerr, William P. Kerr, and William F. Lincoln study the impact of skilled immigrants on the employment structures and innovation outcomes of US firms. Historically, immigration literature has focused on shifts in the supply of workers to the labor market. However, since the H1-B visa is a firm-sponsored visa, the firm is the primary actor in the discussion. Therefore the authors choose to focuses on firm-level data from 450 large American firms spanning the years 1995 to 2008. The data was primarily obtained through the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) database, a resource maintained by the US Census Bureau that includes employer-employee records for all private-sector firms covered by state unemployment insurance reporting requirements across 29 states.

To examine the impact of highly skilled immigrants on firm structure, the authors use two different regression techniques and find a strong positive connection between young skilled immigration and expansion of a firm’s skilled workforce. An increase in young skilled immigrants at a given firm was associated with an increase in the overall share of skilled workers (native and immigrant) as well as in the share of the skilled workers that were immigrants. Although increased immigration was associated with relatively higher departure rates for older workers in STEM occupations as compared to occupations in other fields, the authors find no evidence of increased departure rates from the firm overall in response to more highly skilled immigrants. Therefore they do not find any evidence to support the argument that admitting more highly skilled immigrants would displace existing workers.

The paper also investigates the impact of highly skilled immigrants on innovation through matching their firm-level data to patent data obtained through a US Patent Office data set maintained by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). They find that an increase in highly skilled immigrants was associated with greater levels of invention, i.e. that there was an increase in the number of patents applied for by firms. These innovation gains were primarily gains in quantity as opposed to quality; the authors find that the new innovations were comparable in quality to the firm’s previous work. The gains came from increased contributions by immigrants and from collaboration between natives and immigrants, but there is no clear evidence of any increase in native invention.

These results have major implications for American immigration policy. The finding that the entry of more highly skilled immigrants into the workforce increases the share of skilled workers (both native and immigrant) and increases the level of innovation without resulting in increased departure rates largely supports proponents of expanding the H-1B visa program.

Admitting more highly skilled immigrants, according to this study, increases job opportunities for skilled natives and improves innovation levels at the firms that hire them, although the authors offer no theory on why this is apparently the case. One potential concern that the paper highlights is that, for STEM firms in particular, hiring more highly skilled immigrants might displace some older American workers. But overall, the results show a clear advantage to American firms in hiring high skilled immigrants, and suggest that perhaps they should take a larger role in immigration reform going forward.

Feature Photo: cc/WorldBank

Some analysts worried that such capital outflows, or spillover, from the United States could trigger a currency war if foreign countries responded by implementing more aggressive monetary policies to maintain competitive exchange rates for their currencies. Financial data from 2011 and 2012, however, do not reflect a weakening US dollar or negative spillovers following the implementation of US quantitative easing policies.

The 2012 Spillover Report, published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), finds no significant evidence of dollar depreciation driven by US monetary policy. The IMF evaluated the responses of long-term government bonds, stock market indices, and emerging country exchange rates to announcements by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), a body within the Federal Reserve System. They find that the US dollar depreciated, or lost value, against most currencies only on the days of the FOMC announcements (in August 2011 and January 2012). The impact decreased or disappeared as the US dollar returned to stronger positions over the following days. Interestingly, the US dollar immediately appreciated, or gained value, against emerging countries’ currencies on the day the FOMC announced a monetary policy decreasing the yield on long-term bond.

In the absence of significant capital outflow from the US to foreign countries, the US dollar did not depreciate as analysts expected. Recent data from the US Treasury Department reflects that the capital outflow was not abnormally large from 2011 to 2012. In the years preceding the global financial crisis, investors preferred to purchase foreign bonds in Euros while the US government bond yield was low. But over the past few years, investors lost their appetite for riskier investments amid concerns over the sovereign-debt crisis in Europe. Instead of buying foreign assets, investors began to purchase US Treasury bonds. Meanwhile, portfolio flows to the US actually increased during the periods of quantitative easing announcements. Contrary to expectations, the US experienced capital inflows rather than outflows, so the dollar remained strong against the Euro and most emerging countries’ currencies in 2011 and early 2012.

In short, it is premature to interpret US monetary policy as a tool to depreciate the dollar or hurt other countries’ competitiveness for exports. Capital flows, which are driven by investors’ risk appetite and confidence, might be more significant indicators for recent and current financial conditions. Instead of creating negative effects, monetary easing policy might provide support to the global economy by stabilizing the market during periods of financial crisis.

Feature Photo: cc/jDevaun

In a 2012 paper, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11,” researchers John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart concur with Mayor Bloomberg that the threat of terrorism has been inflated in the United States. The authors contend, “The official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been substantially deluded—massively disproportionate to the threats that al-Qaida has ever actually presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs.”

The authors empirically illustrate the gap between the perceived threat and actual risk of terrorism. For example, while a Gallup poll conducted in 2012 reveals that 35 to 40 percent of Americans worry that they or their family members might become victims of terrorism, research by Mueller and Stewart suggest that the chances of an American perishing at the hands of a terrorist are miniscule, estimated to be “one in 3.4 million per year.” To further illustrate this point, the authors suggest that the number of deaths related to extremist Islamic terrorism in the United States every year is comparable to the number of deaths related to bathtub drowning.

The authors contend that US government institutions have magnified the threat and contributed to, what they call, “terrorism anxiety.” Mueller and Stewart note that government officials inflate the danger of terrorist threats by emphasizing what terrorist plotters hoped to do, rather than what they might have been able to do or what they did. For example, when evaluating the potential impact of a failed suicide attempt on a New York subway in 2009, experts did not guide their assessment by looking at the impact of analogous incidents, such as the London terrorist incident in July 2005 that killed 52 people. Instead, authorities speculated numbers based on what the terrorists hoped to do, and “opined that the attack, if successful, might have killed between 200 and 500 people.”

One of the most revealing aspects of the paper is a cost-benefit analysis of terrorism prevention efforts. Considering the annual costs of security and the probability of a successful attack, the authors find that the amount of money spent on preventing terrorism is disproportionate to the actual threat that terrorism poses. They calculate, “For enhanced US domestic expenditures on homeland security to be deemed cost effective…they would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect against 333 very large attacks that would otherwise have been successful every year.”

Mueller and Stewart conclude that “Anxieties about terrorism persist despite exceedingly limited evidence that much fear is justified” and the costs of such “delusion” are very high. In New York, Mayor Bloomberg told critics, “There are lots of threats to you in the world. There’s the threat of a heart attack for genetic reasons. You can’t sit there and worry about everything. Get a life.” This paper echoes such a statement, and opens more room for debate.

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In a recent paper, “Gender Differences in Preferences, Intra-Household Externalities, and the Low Demand for Improved Cookstoves,” Grant Miller and A. Mushfiq Mobarak examine whether gender dynamics in household decision-making explain the low adoption of clean cookstoves in poor countries. Since women in developing countries bear a disproportionate burden of the health consequences of inefficient stoves, Miller and Mobarak question whether men fully consider the potential health benefits of clean cookstove technology when making financial decisions. They find that women, the main beneficiaries of clean cookstoves, are more likely than men to want to adopt the technology, but men are more likely to refuse to pay for clean cookstoves.

To determine the effect of household gender dynamics on cookstove adoption, Miller and Mobarak conducted a randomized control trial in two rural districts in Bangladesh. The authors randomly selected 50 households from 16 villages in each of the two districts to participate, for a total sample of 799 households. In collaboration with BRAC, a large non-governmental organization, they offered households a choice between an efficient stove, which burns less fuel but releases the same amount of indoor air pollution as traditional stoves, and a “healthy” stove, which uses a chimney to remove air pollution but requires the same amount of fuel as traditional stoves. The authors offered half of the households their choice of stove for free and half of the households their choice of stove for a subsidized price: 50 Taka ($0.70) for the efficient stove or 250 Taka ($3.50) for the healthy stove. To isolate the effect of gender on household decision-making, the authors randomly assigned the husband or wife the responsibility to select a stove, and did not permit them to consult with each other about their decision.

Miller and Mobarak found the decision to select a stove, as well as the type of stove selected, varied significantly by both cost and gender. When considering a free cookstove, both men and women (82 percent of households) overwhelmingly selected the more expensive healthy stove. Furthermore, women were 15 percent more likely to select a healthy stove than men. Surprisingly, 30 percent of the households refused the free stoves, suggesting people may face non-financial barriers to adopting clean cookstove technology.

The introduction of prices changed women’s preferences significantly, however. When faced with a financial decision, most women selected the less expensive stove, which burns fuel more efficiently but produces more pollution. Women were also more likely than men to reject a cookstove altogether. Miller and Mobarak write, “When stoves are offered for free, their choices reflect their own preferences, and women express a stronger preference for healthier stoves. However, they are unable to act on their preferences when even very small positive prices are charged.” Notably, Miller and Mobarak report that women with more education relative to their husbands are more likely to order a healthy stove than women with equal or less education than their husbands, suggesting education may enhance their bargaining power within the household.

In light of their findings, the Miller and Mobarak argue that development initiatives encouraging the adoption of clean cookstove technology must take household gender dynamics into account. Since women bear a disproportionate burden of the costs of inefficient stoves but men’s preferences typically determine household purchases, the authors recommend bundling stoves with other desirable technologies. For example, they note that the Biolite stove generates enough electricity to charge a cell phone, making clean cookstove technology more appealing. At the same time, educated women’s increased bargaining power suggests that investments in female human capital could help encourage households’ adoption of health-related technologies in the developing world. Without accounting for these household imbalances, Miller and Mobarak warn that widespread adoption of clean cookstove technology is unlikely.

Feature Photo: cc/(raccoflickr)

In a recent article, Koen Bartels, Guido Cozzi, and Noemi Mantovan explore the statistical relationship between government expenditures and volunteering using data collected in the United Kingdom from 1991 through 2007 on government expenditures, British households, and volunteer activities. Focusing on employed individuals, the authors find that contrary to the theories behind the Big Society program, a decrease in government spending is associated with a decrease in volunteering.

Previous studies have identified retired citizens and young adults as more likely to volunteer due to flexibility in their time and as an investment in their future careers. However, Bartels, Cozzi, and Mantovan focus their study on employed individuals on the grounds that employed individuals have higher opportunity costs, and therefore are more effective in illustrating the relationship between government expenditures and volunteering. Endowed with a certain amount of time, each individual must appropriate that time to activities considered of importance and receive a certain payoff from those activities. The authors posit that an individual provides unpaid labor because he benefits from the aggregate utility society receives from volunteering. Another key factor in society’s aggregate utility, the authors argue, is government expenditures. As such, employed individuals consider government expenditures in their allocation of time to volunteer work.

The authors regress the likelihood of a person to volunteer on total government expenditures. The data reveals that decreases in total expenditures were strongly correlated with a decrease in the probability that an individual would volunteer. Taking into consideration education, children, marital status, and interest in education, the authors find a statistically significant relationship between a decrease in government expenditures and a decreased likelihood of volunteering.

To help understand why decreasing government expenditures leads to less volunteering, the authors also conduct 19 interviews with residents, city council employees, and public service agencies in Glasgow, Scotland. From these interviews, the authors identify two causes for the reduction in volunteering. First, a lack of government-funded volunteering infrastructure forces volunteers to withdraw support from organizations. Volunteering in professional environments requires professional support and internal organization. If volunteering institutions do not have the funds to provide leadership or training, the lack of structure can be stressful and may lead volunteers to abort their services. Secondly, the authors argue that people volunteer with the goal of making a difference. However, an organization without adequate funding is ineffective and is thus unable to recruit volunteers.

In their analysis of government spending and volunteering, the authors cast serious doubt on the hypothesis that decreasing government spending would promote volunteerism. Instead, the authors recommend three goals to ensure continued volunteer service in Great Britain and abroad. First, government funds should support public services to keep volunteer levels from plummeting. Second, volunteers must consider the work worthwhile. Combining recommendations one and two, the authors’ final recommendation is that government funds should be used to strengthen volunteer support and training infrastructures.

Feature Photo: cc/nvidia.corporation

According to the authors, advanced weapon technologies that seek to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities present new and omnipresent security threats. The global proliferation of new media communications creates rapidly changing and unpredictable social dynamics. To meet these uncertain challenges with increasingly limited fiscal resources, the Defense Department advocates for the development of “globally integrated operations.”

Globally integrated operations emphasize ways in which the U.S. military can reorganize its existing capabilities, rather than develop new capabilities. For instance, the authors highlight the importance of creating a military force that is not only efficient, but also flexible enough to quickly organize to meet emerging contingencies. The U.S. military will combine capabilities across “domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations” with “networks of forces that can form, evolve, dissolve, and reform in different arrangements in time and space with significantly greater fluidity” than today’s force. The proposed Joint Force will combine disparate military and non-military capabilities across “U.S. governmental agencies, partner militaries, and indigenous and regional stakeholder organizations” to meet specific mission needs around the globe at a moment’s notice.

Aware of the challenges involved, the Defense Department acknowledges that the plan is not seamless and will require significant organizational restructuring. For instance emphasizing global breadth and adaptability may require units to develop a more generalist skill set at the expense of highly specialized capabilities, which may limit the force’s effectiveness in some missions that require specialized skills. Focusing on interoperability among military forces will encourage standardization that might further limit the unique and versatile capabilities of specific units. If stretched too thin, the Joint Force may become brittle and less resilient. Decentralization may also challenge coordination and require the development of new communications technology. Finally, potential partners—including military and non-military organizations in and outside of the U.S.—may be unable or unwilling to integrate with the Joint Force.

Amid new threats and a changing security landscape, the U.S. military has to do more with fewer financial resources. Rather than building a static force and making expensive bets on what might happen in the future, the Department of Defense is striving to build an institution with the flexibility necessary to meet unpredictable challenges while positioning itself as one of many components of national power. If it can develop the command and control capacity to make this kind of operation possible, the U.S. military will tradeoff mass and deep specialization for a lean and modular quick response force, a frugal force with a broad reach. Will it stretch too far and too thin? It may not have a choice.

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In a 2012 paper published by the International Journal of Public Opinion Research, “Religious Beliefs, Elite Polarization, and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: The Partisan Gap in American Public Opinion toward Israel,” author Ammon Cavari, a faculty member at the Interdisciplinary Center of Herzliya, Israel, explores the role religious and political beliefs have played in the growing gap in U.S. partisan support for Israel.

The author compiles data from 44 different surveys over a period of 42 years (from 1967 to 2009) to test for significant effects on “sympathies with Israel.” The data show that, over the last 40 years, support for the state of Israel among self-identified Democrats has decreased, dropping from 62 percent in 1967 to 51 percent in 2009. Conversely, among self-identified Republicans, support has increased from 60 percent in 1967 to 80 percent in 2009.

The author uses time series data to conduct linear and logistic regressions to understand the growing cleavage along partisan lines. His models seek to test the flowing hypotheses: (1) “the increased support for Israel among Republicans is explained by the alignment of evangelicals with the Republican Party” and (2) “elite polarization on foreign policy in the last decade expanded the partisan gap in public opinion towards Israel.”

In support of the first hypothesis, Cavari finds that the “odds that a Republican who is Protestant will sympathize with Israel are three to one,” almost twice their level of support in 1988. The author attributes this increase in support to the shifting ideology of the Protestant Church, which, he argues, has seen both a surge of fundamentalism and evangelism since the 1980’s and a realignment with the Republican Party.

In support of the second hypothesis, the author finds that “an increase in one percentage point in Congressional polarization increases the Israel gap between Republican and Democratic identifier by .14 points.” This effect intensifies with the inclusion of Evangelical Christians: “A one percentage point increase in the attachment of Evangelical Christians with the Republican Party increases the Israel gap by .21 points.”

The “aggregate effect” of Cavari’s regressions shows that Evangelical Christians’ realignment with the Republican Party has increased conservative support for Israel, and that “the polarization in American politics on domestic and foreign policies has further expanded this gap.” If these findings are correct, it will be interesting to see how the partisan cleavages play out at the foreign policy level. As both Obama and Netanyahu begin a second term, a divided U.S. public may exacerbate the problems already present in their leaders’ “loveless marriage.”

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